Initiatives in VET and Workplace Learning: A Korean Perspective

Introduction

Studies of the ‘East Asian Miracle’ have shed light on the major role of education policies in the remarkable economic growth in East Asia between 1965 and 1996 (World Bank, 1993; Green, 1997; Ashton et al., 1999). During this period, while the average annual growth of GNP in the world level was 3.1 per cent, South Korea grew at 8.9 per cent, Singapore at 8.3 per cent and Hong Kong at 7.5 per cent (Castells, 1999: 206). As a result, the East Asian countries have been regarded as models to explain the important roles of the government in promoting economic development (Johnson, 1982; Amsden, 1989; Castells, 1992, 1999; Stiglitz, 2002). Moreover, East Asian skills formation systems have been regarded as among the main contributors to the rapid economic development (Ashton and Green, 1996; Ashton et al., 1999).

As in Korea, East Asian developmental states have been challenged by globalisation and democratisation since the mid-1980s. In particular, the economic crisis in Asian countries in 1997–8 ignited heated discussions on the implications of globalisation for the role of developmental states. Castells argues that the success of the developmental state in economic development has ironically contributed to its demise in East Asian economies because of the incompatibility of the developmental state with the global and informational paradigm (Castells, 1999). However, as he also has to admit, the pattern of economic development and crisis in the East Asian countries was ‘dependent on the specific set of relationship between the state, economy and society’ (ibid. p. 213; Henderson, 1998).

Japan shows how the developmental state came to an end throughout the 1990s because of its contradiction with global and informational capitalism. Castells points to three sets of factors as main causes of the demise of the Japanese developmental state (Castells, 1999). First, the financial system got out of government control under the conditions of the rapid globalisation of financial markets. Secondly, a transformation of the industrial development model toward ‘global decentralization’ undermined the ‘systemic interaction between the developmental state and Japanese-based multinational networks’ (ibid. pp. 235–6). Thirdly, the social [Page 237]structure based on patriarchalism was threatened by the rapid mobilisation of women through the increase of their participation in the political system as well as in the labour market.

By contrast, Singapore is an example which shows that global and informational capitalisation has been compatible with the developmental state. Since the 1990s, Singaporean economic strategy has changed, becoming more flexible and open under the challenge of globalisation (Mallet, 1999: 268–9). Its financial markets have been globalised and made transparent under state control. However, it is evident that a maturing economy and information revolution bring ‘a more complex society’ and multiply ‘the number and capabilities of competing interests’ (George, 2000: 198). This change increasingly requires a shift from a top-down, charismatic mode towards democratic and institutional mechanisms.

Taiwan shows a successful transition to democracy in response to globalisation. The consistent achievement of a ‘soft landing’ of Taiwan economy has been accompanied by political liberalisation since 1987. During the 1990s, the Taiwan government played a ‘secondary role in the growing competitiveness of Taiwanese firms’ while ‘networks’ of these firms in Taiwan and other countries found ‘their own way out of the semiconductor slump’ (Castells, 1999: 291). The largest reserves of foreign currency in the world could protect the economy from speculative attacks during the economic crisis.

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