Constructivism and International Relations

In this chapter I will explore where constructivism came from, what brings constructivists together–and thus sets them apart from adherents of other international relations (IR) approaches–what divides constructivists, and where constructivism is and should be going. In particular, I will show that constructivists deal extensively with metaphysics and social theories less for their own sake than because constructivism provides a firm basis for building better IR theories.

In addition, I will argue that despite the divisions among constructivists concerning serious issues, all constructivists (modernist, modernist linguistic and critical)–with the exception, perhaps, of the extreme postmodernist wing of radical constructivism–share two understandings: what Stefano Guzzini (2000: 149) summarized as the social construction of knowledge and the construction of social reality. In combination, these understandings are constructivism's common ground, the view that the material world does not come classified, and that, therefore, the objects of our knowledge are not independent of our interpretations and our language. This means that different collective meanings are attached to the material world twice, as social reality and as scientific knowledge. In other words, knowledge is both a resource that people use in their day-to-day life for the construction of social reality, and the theories, concepts, meanings and symbols that scientists use to interpret social reality.

This dichotomous description is offered for analytical purposes only. For reflexive knowledge or interpretation of the world, when imposed on material reality, becomes knowledge for the world–the power to change the world in accordance with collective understandings and, concurrently, with human motives and intentional acts. The above analysis means not only that there is no perfect correlation between objects ‘out there’ in nature and our classifications of nature, but also that social facts, which are the objects of our study, emerge from the interaction between knowledge and the material world, neither of which is invariant.

Unlike positivism1 and materialism,2 which take the world as it is, constructivism sees the world as a project under construction, as becoming rather than being. Unlike idealism3 and post-structuralism and postmodernism,4 which take the world only as it can be imagined or talked about, constructivism accepts that not all statements have the same epistemic value and that there is consequently some foundation for knowledge.

I start by tracing four constructivist IR approaches to their philosophical and sociological roots and suggest a synthesis between pragmatism and realism. The next section provides a brief historical account of the evolution of IR constructivism. In my third section I describe three aspects of IR constructivism: (1) the common ground (in ontology, epistemology and methods), (2) conceptual contributions to IR theory (what I call its ‘added value’) and (3) substantive empirical contributions. The fourth section then introduces the major debates within constructivism. Finally, I propose an agenda for helping constructivism become more firmly established in IR. In particular, I emphasize the need to focus constructivist debates on methodological issues.

The Philosophical and Sociological Foundations of Constructivism

Constructivism, which reached the shores of IR in the 1980s, describes the dynamic, contingent and culturally based condition of the social world. It has major implications for an understanding of knowledge, including scientific knowledge, and how to achieve it. Constructivism thus has the potential to transform the understanding of social reality in the social sciences. It stresses the reciprocal relationship between nature and human knowledge and suggests a view of the social sciences that is contingent, partly indeterminate, nominalist,5 and to some extent externally validated (Kuhn, 1970). With the exception of its radical postmodern wing, however, constructivism does not challenge science, rationalism and modernity; it merely makes science more compatible with the constructivist understanding of social reality.

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