Kuwait

KUWAIT IS A RENTIER state that earns most of its income from its oil exports and from foreign investments. Oil revenues have been used to sustain an extensive infrastructure and industrial development, as well as a welfare system not based on taxation. Some of the benefits allocated by the state to citizens are low-interest loans, subsidies and special prices, social allowances, and gifts for marriage dowries. More than 90 percent of Kuwaiti citizens are employed by the public sector, which has led to an increasingly bureaucratic organization of society.

Kuwait has seen significant improvements in infant mortality, life expectancy, and other social indicators. Official government statistics indicate relatively low levels of absolute poverty and income inequality. However, if one is to extend the definition of poverty to include power relations and social as well as political exclusion mechanisms, then a slightly different picture emerges.

Although Kuwait is fairly homogenous in terms of its level of urbanization and infrastructure development, there seem to be strong indications that several administrative regions have varying socioeconomic and demographic disparity, which is most clearly illustrated when comparing the capital city (Kuwait City) with Al-Jahra. This latter district was made up mainly of non-Kuwaitis, who are predominantly temporary migrant workers from east Asia.

[Page 619]Non-Kuwaiti is a status allocated to those who are not citizens of Kuwait and hence the term carries certain disadvantages. Non-Kuwaitis have no legal rights, and cannot secure a working permit or residency without the guarantee of a Kuwaiti national. Furthermore, non-Kuwaitis do not have access to the welfare system to which Kuwaitis are entitled, and Kuwaitis are preferentially recruited, need lower qualifications for the same job, and are preferentially promoted over non-Kuwaitis regardless of qualification.

Even in limited cases when naturalization is granted to non-Kuwaiti citizens, they are considered second-class citizens. They may not vote in elections and may not run for elected office at the subcabinet level or above the executive branch. Moreover they are subject to deportation and their citizenship status is subject to revocation at the discretion of the minister of the interior. Citizenship delineates a crucial distinguishing criterion between those entitled to certain privileges (citizenship and economic security) and those denied those privileges (noncitizenship).

The legal status of tens of thousands of bidoon residents remained unresolved. The bidoon (an Arabic term meaning “without” as in “without citizenship”) are Arabs who have residency ties to the country, some persisting for generations and some for briefer periods, but who either lack or have failed to produce documentation of their nationality. The exact number of bidoon residents is unknown, but has been estimated at upward of 100,000.

Since the mid-1980s, the government has actively discriminated against the bidoon in areas such as education, medical care, employment, and mobility. Although the government eliminated the bidoon from the census rolls and discontinued their access to most government jobs, some bidoon work in the armed forces and are now being accepted in the institutions of the Public Authority for Applied Education and Training. The government has denied the bidoon official documents such as birth certificates, marriage certificates, civil identification, and drivers' licenses, which made it difficult for many unregistered bidoon, particularly younger bidoon, to find employment.

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