War Powers Resolution

The War Powers Resolution was an attempt by Congress to assert its primacy in warmaking policy decisions. Although presidents have often used military force without a resolution for war, Congress felt compelled to correct this situation only during the Vietnam War era. Even then, Congress' actions were a corrective for a problem it had largely created itself.

According to Article I, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, the power to declare war rests with Congress. The national legislature is also responsible for raising and supporting the armed forces. In Article II, section 2, however, the president is designated commander in chief of the Army and Navy. This establishes something of a war-making partnership between the legislative and executive branches of the government, a provision intended to prevent unnecessary wars.

Early on August 1, 1964, North Vietnamese torpedo boats fired on USS Maddox while the destroyer was on a spying mission in the Gulf of Tonkin. Although the attackers were driven away, Pres. Lyndon B. Johnson dispatched USS C. Turner Joy to join the Maddox in the gulf. On August 4, both ships reported a second attack by the North Vietnamese. Despite serious doubts about whether the vessels were fired upon, Johnson asked Congress for authority to use military force to deter further attacks. With only two dissenting Senate votes, the legislature passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution on August 7, authorizing the president “to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.” Through this resolution the president deployed the first combat troops to South Vietnam. Over the next few years, the number of Americans fighting in Vietnam rose, peaking at around 500,000 in 1968. By the time Johnson left office in 1969, dissatisfaction with escalation in Vietnam already had many congresspersons considering ways to keep the executive branch from again engaging the nation in undeclared wars. In 1971, Congress quietly withdrew the president's unrestricted authority to make war by repealing the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. Furthermore, by 1973, congressional gall at America's continued involvement in Vietnam and the Watergate scandal surrounding Pres. Richard M. Nixon moved Congress to pass the War Powers Resolution. Intended to check presidential interference with Congress' constitutional prerogative to declare war, the resolution was narrowly passed over Nixon's veto on November 7.

The War Powers Resolution was not intended to shut the president out of decisions for war, but rather to make the process more collaborative without obstructing the executive branch's authority to respond promptly during [Page 916]military crises. Indeed, the law is called a resolution rather than an act as a concession to congresspersons who worried that a statute required a constitutional amendment. A resolution also seemed to preserve congressional rights while preventing presidential abuse of war powers. In the event of an emergency, the president was required to inform the legislature that a military response had, or would be, employed, and provide justification for using armed force. The report had to be made within 48 hours of taking action. From that moment, Congress had 60 days to determine whether the president's decision was legal. If congressional approval was not forthcoming, military forces had to return home by the end of the two month decision window, although the president could request a 30-day extension. Moreover, Congress reserved the right to require the president to bring deployed military forces home at any point during the 60-day period.

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