Naval War College

The Naval War College was established in 1884 in Newport, Rhode Island. Sec. of the Navy William Chandler, supported by Progressive reformers such as Adm. David Dixon Porter and Adm. Stephen Luce, argued that the Navy desperately needed such an institution. Before the creation of the Naval War College, an officer's formal education ended after graduation from the Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland. The War College was intended to serve as an advanced professional school for middle- and senior-grade officers who needed to prepare for higher command. Its creation also symbolized the growing professionalism of the naval officer corps, which coincided with the emergence of other recognizable professions during the Progressive movement of the late 19th century.

Stephen Luce's appointment as the college's first president helped establish its professional credentials and tone. Luce designed the college to be engaged in original research that supported the Navy's strategic objectives. Students completed a one-year program of seminars, lectures, and readings that focused on practical problems. Special emphasis was given to strategic planning, operational concepts, and the impact of new technology. Although most faculty members were naval officers, the college later hired civilian scholars along with visiting faculty from the other armed services. Undoubtedly, Luce's most important appointment to the college was Capt. Alfred Thayer Mahan, a professor of naval history and his eventual successor as president.

The founding of the Naval War College also reflected the transition from a “brown-water” to a “blue-water” Navy. The proper focus of naval operations was an ongoing source of debate in the 19th century. Proponents of a brown-water Navy insisted on a more limited role that focused on coastal defense. Blue-water enthusiasts, on the other hand, suggested a more expansive role with the Navy projecting the nation's diplomatic and economic interests overseas. Concerns about national security did not directly influence this transition; the Atlantic and Pacific oceans kept the country well protected from its greatest threats. However, by the late 19th century, the United States was discovering substantial interests overseas. These concerns gained momentum with the publication of Mahan's seminal book, The Influence of Seapower upon History (1890), which helped support this shift toward a blue-water Navy.

Mahan's theories went hand in glove with the Open Door policy of the United States, which stated the country's intentions to keep the Chinese market free of European colonialism and hence open to American trade and business development. The Naval War College also contributed to the protection of national interests through strategic planning, commonly known as wargaming. Officers examined various contingencies and developed detailed plans to address them. Students were encouraged to think broadly and to speculate on a wide range of potential threats. Although some adversaries seemed more likely than others, the college even considered hostile scenarios involving countries that were normally allies.

By the 20th century, most major powers engaged in some form of contingency planning. The collective efforts of the Naval War College and the Army's War Plans Division helped to create the famous Color Plans in the decade or so before World War I and Rainbow Plans in the 1930s, which were the cornerstone of American grand strategy before World War II. The War College devoted most of its attention to War Plan Orange, the scenario involving Japan. Military leaders suspected that hostilities were most likely to erupt in the Western Pacific during a period of increasing tension. If this did occur, the Japanese would attempt to secure victory by destroying the major American installations in the area, especially in the Philippines. American success thus depended upon how quickly a relief effort could be mounted. The Navy could expect increasing levels of attacks the closer it approached the major theater of operations.

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