Mormons, Campaign against the (1857–58)

From its beginnings, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints had experienced persecution and violence from other Americans. After moving to more isolated western land in 1846, the Mormons' new Zion became the Utah Territory under U.S. control as a result of the Mexican Cession. The underlying causes of the campaign against the Mormons were anti-Mormon prejudices in American soci-ety, but the immediate causes were the power struggles between the church and the federal government.

Brigham Young, the Mormons' leader, was named terri-torial governor in 1850, but the attempt to reconcile non-Mormon territorial officials with Mormon believers and their ways led to a number of sharp conflicts. On one side, a string of incompetent or staunchly anti-Mormon territorial officials and, on the other side, the Mormons, ever mindful of their having disobeyed laws or judgments they regarded as unjust, created a strained political environment. In 1857, three territorial non-Mormon officials spread tales of Mormon violence and rebellion, claiming that they had had to flee to save themselves. Although these complaints were tainted by half-truths, the prevailing anti-Mormon attitudes in American society demanded that the government teach the unruly sect a lesson. In May 1857, Pres. James Buchanan ordered Commanding Gen. Winfield Scott to send about 2,000 soldiers to escort the new territorial governor, Alfred Cumming of Georgia, to the Utah Territory and to ensure the proper execution of federal laws.

Given Utah's location in the mountains, the Army raced against time and the oncoming winter. The expedition was rapidly organized and two regiments were sent, but one, the 5th Infantry, was unfit for action after its difficult duty hunt-ing Seminoles in Florida. Supplies and provisions were also rapidly bought and concentrated. Last, a change in com-mand was made early on, to Col. Albert Sidney Johnston, but he was not with the forces when they moved west. When the infantry moved, its members did not move together but were days apart; the cavalry support was months behind.

The Mormons regarded the movement as an invasion, not an escort, and decided to resist. They adopted a scorched earth and harassment strategy—trying to obstruct the Army, stampede its livestock, and burn grass before the column. They hoped to have the expedition caught in the mountains during the winter. This the Mormons did most effectively on October 4 and 5, 1857, when they exploited a 30-mile gap between the two infantry regiments and the Army's lack of cavalry by attacking three wagon trains, burn-ing 72 supply wagons carrying food.

Short of supplies, still without an ultimate com-mander, and facing the onset of bad weather in the moun-tains, the expedition temporarily attempted a roundabout march into northern Utah from Ham's Fork in southwest Wyoming on October 11. When Johnston made contact in late October, he ordered the force back to Ham's Fork and began a 35-mile march to Fort Bridger on November 6. The march was slow, painful, and very arduous. Snowstorms hit, with temperatures falling to as low as 40°F below zero. Many draft animals and horses died along the march, and nearly two weeks were needed to cover the 35 miles, but only one man died on the way. Upon reaching Fort Bridger, the Army discovered that the Mormons had burned it. Johnston, a careful and duti-ful officer, had set up an adequate camp nearby for the expedition and the new territorial officials. With the few supplies available, Johnston kept his forces busy and well [Page 536]disciplined. By the spring of 1858, the expedition had high morale and a fighting spirit.

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