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Coauthored by Arizona Republican senator Barry Goldwater, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and Alabama Democratic representative William Nichols, the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, the Goldwater–Nichols Act of 1986 instituted profound changes to the operations and management of the U.S. Department of Defense. Signed into law by Pres. Ronald Reagan on October 1, 1986, it was intended to remedy certain operational and administrative failings encountered throughout the Vietnam War, in the 1982 Marine Corps barracks bombing in Beirut, Lebanon, and in the invasion of Grenada in 1983. The bill sought to improve the quality of military advice provided to civilian decision makers, place greater responsibility upon combatant commanders, and institute greater cooperation and coordination among the individual military services.

The origins of Goldwater–Nichols can be traced back three decades prior to the bill's final passage. Various executive committees commissioned by presidents throughout the 1960s and 1970s concluded that chronic service parochialism hampered the efficient functioning of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). As early as 1947, civilian authorities found that individual JCS chiefs tended to grant authority to their respective service commanders alone rather than to officers responsible for leading an integrated armed force. These types of flaws led not only to ambiguities in determining the extent of a commanding officer's authority, but also promoted disunity among the different armed services. Following the 1975 withdrawal of U.S. military forces from South Vietnam, American civilian decision makers in both the White House and Congress reexamined the basic practices and responsibilities of the JCS. Lawmakers reiterated the presidential commission findings, affirming concerns that the individual services tended to supersede joint considerations. As legislators called for institutional alterations, they concentrated most on measures for consolidating military advice solely with the JCS chairman and for removing service-specific responsibilities from the other chiefs. Bipartisan congressional efforts toward changing JCS functions and management began in earnest following the February 1982 testimony of JCS chairman Gen. David C. Jones, in which he emphasized the inadequate organization of national defense.

In response to General Jones's warning, the Goldwater– Nichols Act outlined advising roles for both high-level civilian leaders and various high-ranking military officers. Regarding civilian positions, the law clarified where service planners were to gather military information, as well as who was to serve as the final authority in providing military advice—either the secretary of defense or individual civilian service secretaries. Under Section 113(k), the secretary of defense was to guide the formation of national security recommendations and policy for all departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, in turn, were each responsible to the defense secretary for the formation of national security policies and programs for each of their departments. Under the act's provisions, the secretary of defense alone, rather than each of the individual civilian service secretaries, was authorized to act as the president's principal civilian source of military counsel from the Pentagon.

The most extensive organizational alterations that stemmed from the 1986 legislation affected the Joint Chiefs of Staff and its chairman. Section 151(b) stipulated that the chairman was to serve as the principal military adviser to the president, National Security Council, and the secretary of defense. Section 151(c) specified that the remaining JCS members, as well as combatant commanders, were to serve the chairman as resources for formulating military recommendations. In addition to advising these high-ranking civilian authorities, Section 153(a) charged the chairman with directing military strategy, planning and preparing potential military responses, and assessing defense budget needs. To aid with these wide-ranging responsibilities, the bill created the new position of vice chairman, an officer with vaguely defined statutory duties responsible to the chairman and secretary of defense.

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