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In October 1962 the United States and the Soviet Union came closer to war than the two superpowers ever had—or ever would. After a 13-day confrontation, Pres. John F. Kennedy and Premier Nikita Khrushchev backed off, with both making substantial concessions. The Cuban Missile Crisis, as it is known in the United States—in the Soviet Union, it was called “the Caribbean Crisis,” and in Cuba “the October Crisis”—not only represented the apex of the Cold War but was also its most dramatic turning point. The Cuban Missile Crisis has had an enduring legacy in American culture, in scholarship on nuclear deterrence and crisis bargaining, and in recent vigorous debates over nuclear proliferation.

Historical Background

At the beginning of 1959, Cuban guerillas led by Fidel Castro overthrew the pro-American dictator Fulgencio Batista. Bymid-1960 Castro had firmly oriented the new regime against the United States, and his government grew increasingly dependent on the Soviet Union for military and economic aid. Soon after his inauguration, the newly installed President Kennedy approved an Eisenhower administration plan for a military invasion by Cuban exiles. The exiles landed at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961, were swiftly crushed by the Cuban military, and the expected popular uprising failed to materialize. The Bay of Pigs fiasco reinforced the Kennedy administration's commitment to removing Castro from power, to the point that some have characterized it as an “obsession.” Kennedy authorized the largest covert operation in CIA history, Operation Mongoose, to undermine the Castro regime and Cuban economy and perhaps to assassinate Castro. He also ordered the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare plans for a future invasion of the island. In 1962 the administration succeeded in barring Cuba from the Organization of American States, in putting in place a comprehensive economic embargo, and in pressuring 15 Latin American nations to break off relations with Cuba. In the eyes of Kennedy and his advisers, a strong stance on Cuba was necessary to forestall aggressive Soviet action in a more consequential place: Berlin.

Khrushchev, too, saw the fate of his country and his leadership wrapped up in the fate of Cuba. The People's Republic of China was increasingly challenging the U.S.S.R.'s leadership of the Communist world, and a failure to defend Cuba with sufficient vigor threatened to undercut the Soviet Union's standing. Moreover, in late 1961 and early 1962, U.S. Jupiter missiles stationed in Turkey finally became operational, placing the Soviet Union at an even greater strategic disadvantage: the United States held a 4 to 1 edge in intercontinental ballistic missiles and a 17 to 1 edge in deliverable warheads. In addition to these political and strategic incentives, Khrushchev also thought he saw an opportunity for Communist gains, believing that Kennedy was cautious, if not timid, and would not risk nuclear armageddon. When, in the late spring of 1962, Khrushchev offered to bring Cuba firmly within the Soviet Union's orbit and to deploy nuclear missiles under Soviet control, Castro, who with good reason feared for his life and for his regime, enthusiastically accepted the proposition.

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