Skip to main content icon/video/no-internet

The Peloponnesian War (431–404 BCE) was more than a classic conflict between two Greek city-states and their allies; it was also a clash of ideologies—a democracy (Athens) and an oligarchy (Sparta)—and of opposing views on the nature of the world. This war is an example of conflict between two militaries with very different and incompatible styles of fighting; thus, it serves as an example of adaptation (or the lack of it). A large volume of information, including contemporary accounts of the war, has survived, providing greater detail than is known about any other ancient war. Because of the opponents' political and military differences and the amount of information available, modern war colleges study the Peloponnesian War in terms of strategies, consequences of actions, and politics.

History of the War

The cause of the Peloponnesian War dates back to the time of the Greek wars with the Persians in the early 5th century BCE. Sparta, with its totally land-based military, had taken command of the Hellenic League. The seafaring powers resented Sparta's leadership, especially over naval forces. Athens, a sea power, accepted leadership of a new league of sea-power states called the Delian League in 479–478 BCE. Sparta remained the leader of the land-power states called the Peloponnesian League. Tension mounted between Athens and Sparta until war broke out in 460 BCE. The causes of the conflict, sometimes called the First Peloponnesian War, include Spartan suspicion of the growing Athenian empire, the defection of the city of Megara to Athens, and the Athenian construction of a long wall to the sea. The war continued until the both sides ratified the Thirty Years' Peace in 445 BCE.

The conflict restarted in 431 BCE, beginning the Peloponnesian War. Historians divide the war into three phases: the Archidamian war (431–421), the Sicilian campaigns (420–413), and the Decelean war (413–404). In the Archidamian war, Sparta launched brief land invasions into Attica in hopes of scaring Athens into capitulation. This strategy did not work, for two reasons. First, Sparta was far from home, which made sustaining operations difficult. Second, Sparta's slave class, the Helots, was always at risk of revolting when the army was away. Therefore, the Spartan army tended to keep excursions brief in order to prevent a Helot uprising. Athens, following the advice of their army general, Pericles, chose to fight a passive war, to remain behind her strong city walls, and to avoid a direct land battle. Athens did raid the Peloponnesian coast using her superior navy. Their aim was to harass Sparta and her allies in the hope that the Spartans would withdraw to Peloponnesus and sue for peace. Neither strategy worked nor could one side exploit the other side's weakness in order to win a decisive battle. This period concluded with the Peace of Nicias in 421 BCE.

The peace reflected poorly on Sparta in that its allies thought Sparta had sold them out; however, it gave the Athenians time to rest, rearm, and reevaluate their strategy. Athens, with a new general named Alcibiades, a new fleet, a replenished treasury, and a pacified empire, decided to take the offensive. Athens convinced Argos, Sparta's greatest rival, to join the alliance. Athens sent troops to Argos for a battle with Sparta, but they were too few in number. Sparta won the battle and regained the momentum; Athens had lost an opportunity to win the war.

...

  • Loading...
locked icon

Sign in to access this content

Get a 30 day FREE TRIAL

  • Watch videos from a variety of sources bringing classroom topics to life
  • Read modern, diverse business cases
  • Explore hundreds of books and reference titles

Sage Recommends

We found other relevant content for you on other Sage platforms.

Loading