Representation

Electoral Representation

There seems to be a consensus that democratic political institutions perform better than autocratic ones in their responsiveness to the needs of the poor. However, because of the incentives that electoral competition in democracies produces for voters to choose representatives who will reflect their preferences in political decision making, the incentives that electoral competition yields are themselves conditioned on the voting system in place in these countries. For instance, when voting systems are structured in such a way that politicians must rely on the electoral support of geographically concentrated poor neighborhoods or communities to gain or maintain office, there is a greater likelihood that they will be more responsive to the interests of these groups.

Although there seems to be no consensus on the issue, there is a large body of research in political science upholding proportional representation (PR) as one such voting system that can increase the representation of minorities and the poor. While it is not a magic wand, PR, it is argued, represents a viable alternative to majoritarian winner-takes-all electoral systems such as single-member district (SMD) or first-past-the-post (FPTP), which are skewed in favor of larger and more organized political parties to the disadvantage of many smaller parties representing groups and communities that have been traditionally denied access to power. Under a PR system, these smaller parties have a fair share of representation, as votes cast for them are significant in determining the electoral outcome and a governing coalition, instead of being wasted or lost, as is the case under the majoritarian systems.

However, even when voting rules force politicians to be responsive to low-income voters, such incentives can be severed when political mobilization or electoral competition is dominated by patronage and clientelism through practices like vote-buying. Incentives can also be severed in elections that are characterized by such brazen manipulation and vote-rigging that the votes no longer count. Such practices distort the power that poor people should have to make meaningful electoral choices in electing representatives who will be responsive to their policy interests/preferences, or who might provide the avenue through which poor individuals could hold elected representatives accountable for their decisions while in office. Especially in poor democracies characterized by unequal distribution of income and wealth, poor people are more inclined to exchange their votes for benefits such as cash, clothes, food, cooking oil, or (continuing) access to jobs in the public service. This creates misaligned incentives that encourage elected officials to underinvest in social services for the poor, divert government funds for personal gains, or redirect social programs toward their rich and high-income supporters and away from propoor redistribution.

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