Eckstein v. Kirby

It is axiomatic among communication theorists that the truthfulness of spoken language from intimate conversation to public speeches cannot be discerned simply by the words, that inflection and nuance, body language, demeanor, facial expressions, and delivery itself (particularly pauses) all play a part in any listener’s being able to judge veracity and credibility, whether to believe the speaker. That responsibility, of course, is at the core of the American jury system; fair verdicts hinge on each juror’s watching and listening to the proceedings and then exercising his or her common sense, intuition, and reason to weigh, according to the law, all the testimony delivered in open court. Jury duty, along with serving in the military, paying taxes, and voting, are fundamental privileges of American citizens.

The question central to the 1978 United States Sixth District Court suit brought by Teresa Eckstein was simple. Do the Deaf belong on a jury? On March 20, Eckstein, an Arkansas Deaf woman who had been summoned for petit jury duty in a felony case in Pulaski County Circuit Court, was dismissed on the grounds of her disability during voir dire, the pretrial process in which the jury is seated. Lawyers for both sides and the trial judge, in this case William J. Kirby, can dismiss jurors without explanation. Eckstein appeared in court accompanied by her signing interpreter, Clarence F. Landon. Landon, who was not himself deaf, identified himself to the court, citing his experience in other state trials—but to assist defendants and/or witnesses, not jurors. The judge inquired whether Eckstein would require the interpreter. When Eckstein indicated the affirmative, the judge dismissed her. Eckstein’s dismissal was based on sound Arkansas law and ample precedence: Arkansas state law, along with that of 37 other states, denied grand and petit jury rights to any persons unable to speak or understand English or persons whose sense of hearing (or sight, for that matter) was impaired.

Eckstein took exception to the judge’s action. An accomplished and successful woman, Eckstein could read, write, and understand English at a high level and was thoroughly versed in American [Page 337]Sign Language. In addition, she had roots in the community—she was a lifelong resident of the county and had paid taxes. A graduate of the Arkansas School for the Deaf and a stable and contributing employee in the telecommunications division of a local business, she took decisive action. On March 27, she filed suit in United States District Court challenging the judge’s decision as arbitrary and discriminatory and a violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Eckstein believed that a Deaf person would be able to evaluate testimony, participate fully in the duties of a juror, and then contribute meaningfully to deliberations in the court’s effort to render a true and valid verdict. In essence, Eckstein saw the judge’s action as denying the Deaf their rightful place as citizens. With manageable accommodations, the Deaf could perform jury service. In her suit, however, Eckstein took a far more modest position: the state law should take into account the possibility of individual deaf citizens who would able to perform jury duty according to the constitutionally set responsibilities. Eckstein’s lawyers argued Deaf people could not be treated as a group.

...