United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia

Led by Carlo Castaño, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, or AUC) is a right-wing paramilitary group formed in 1984 to combat guerrilla militias in Colombia. Its use of terror to destroy the guerrilla's support base has made it a feared and powerful force in that country.

Since the mid-1960s, the Colombian government has been fighting several leftist terror groups, with the two largest being the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army-Colombia (ELN). The activities of these groups, combined with the cocaine industry (in which the FARC is heavily involved), have made Colombia a very dangerous country. In addition to bombing, extortion, and attacks on military bases and oil pipelines, both the ELN and the FARC have used kidnapping for ransom as a major source of revenue. Initiated in the late 1970s, kidnappings had become endemic in Colombia by the 1980s.

In the early 1980s, confronted by violence that the government seemed unable to master, right-wing businessmen, ranchers, and members of the military began to train and arm vigilante militias to combat guerrilla forces in their areas. One of the largest such groups was called Muerte a Secuestradores (MAS), which means “Death to Kidnappers.” MAS was led by Carlo Castaño, whose father, a rancher, had been kidnapped by guerrillas and murdered when the Castaño family could not meet the full ransom demand. These groups, seen as a way for ordinary people to strike back at the guerrillas, were and continue to be popular with much of the public. Their methods, however, are brutal; for the most part, those killed in the 1980s by the MAS and other vigilante groups were not armed guerrillas but unarmed peasants accused of sympathizing with the guerrilla cause. By 1983, Amnesty International accused MAS of more than 800 extrajudicial killings.

In 1984 the Colombian government initiated a short-lived truce with the guerrilla groups, but many hard-line elements in the military and business communities completely opposed the truce. Support for the vigilantes increased, and they soon formed a coalition, the AUC. Castaño quickly became the leader.

As the AUC grew larger, it began to move beyond the control of the right-wingers who had originally funded it, becoming more like a private army for Castaño. Members attacked villages with roving columns of up to several hundred fighters. AUC's forces lived in jungle camps but also maintained a presence in captured towns. As the AUC took over more villages, it gained control of coca-producing areas. The group then took on the protection of traffickers and growers—just as the guerrillas had—and like the guerrillas, the AUC charged the drug lords handsomely for the service. That drug money enabled the group to equip its fighters with modern weapons and communications equipment, and to pay them a wage much better that that of the average Colombian. Perhaps more important, it also allowed them to pay hefty sums to guerrilla informers, enabling conquered villages to be purged of sympathizers.