Taliban Code of Conduct

In 2009 the Afghan Taliban leadership, exiled in Pakistan, issued a “code of conduct,” known formally as the “Taliban 2009 Rules and Regulations Booklet.” The booklet provided guidance to local, regional, and provincial Taliban commanders, who enjoyed some autonomy in deciding which operations to conduct and running their territory of control. The booklet aimed to consolidate command and control of the Taliban movement and introduce discipline among the rank and file.

Comprising 11 chapters and 59 articles, the code was prepared by the advisory council of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Although most Taliban fighters are illiterate, the “code” is issued to every fighter as a 64-page pocket book. It is available in Pashtu, Urdu, Arabic, and English, and it is likely the booklet will be translated to other languages as more nationalities fight alongside the Afghan Taliban. The Taliban leadership has insisted that not only its fighters but also foreigners that fight in Afghanistan should adhere to its “code.”

The booklet marked an attempt to create an internal disciplinary system through which the Taliban could enforce its own laws of war. To increase legitimacy, the code departed from an earlier 2006 code and contains rules similar to the International Humanitarian Law. The text states, [Page 576]for example, that “all mujahideen must do their best to avoid civilian deaths and injuries and damage to civilian property.” Nevertheless, the code does not forbid suicide operations, and indeed it provides strict guidelines as to who might undertake such operations, and under what circumstances.

Beyond its immediate guidelines on behavior, the code also sheds considerable light on the structure and aims of the Afghan Taliban, which is seeking to recover its “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” regime of 1996–2001 by continuing to fight against coalition and Afghan forces and the Afghan government. The code was thus calibrated to achieve the next step for the Taliban: to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan populace. Historically regarded as a dogmatic group impervious to external developments, the exiled leadership of the Afghan Taliban apparently hoped the new code would help to transform the ruthless group into a more populist movement.

With the orientation of Afghan and coalition forces changing in Afghanistan, the Afghan Taliban will ensure compliance to the code or risk alienation. Yet the code will probably not be followed, most notably by Pakistani Taliban, whose oath of allegiance pledged to Mullah Omar is symbolic, not functional. The Afghan Taliban wants to exercise control over the two-dozen Pakistani Taliban factions mounting deadly attacks against Pakistani targets, but the bulk of these factions are not expected to heed the advice.

The Pakistani Taliban itself remained fragmented in 2010, with factions willing to cease attacks inside Pakistan termed “soft Taliban” and others insistent on attacks known as “hard Taliban.” As of 2010, the Afghan Taliban's influence over Pakistani Taliban appeared to be dwindling, and it seemed likely that the code would be followed only by the Afghan Taliban itself, rather than the majority of the groups active in region.