New Terrorism, The

One of the biggest challenges facing international counterterrorism professionals is the ever-evolving typology of terrorism. While nationalist and anti-colonial movements characterized twentieth-century terrorism, the terrorism of the twenty-first century is significantly different in nature. Modern-day terrorism, typified by the al Qaeda network, has truly distinguished itself from its predecessors. A loose cell-based organizational structure, a religious motivation, and asymmetrical tactics are just some of the characterizations of this new terrorism.

Late-twentieth-century terrorism was primarily shaped by nationalist and anticolonial movements. From the Front de Libération du Québec, a Quebecois separatist group, and the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Fatherland and Liberty, or ETA), to the Front de Libération Nationale, a socialist anticolonial party in Algeria, and the Irish Republican Army, these groups typify the old hierarchical, top-down terrorism, whose activities were primarily directed at government forces. While the terrorist groups of the twenty-first century have adopted some of the characteristics of their predecessors, they have also evolved into an even more menacing threat—that of an amorphous, indistinct, and broad movement. While it is not the only terrorist group operating today, al Qaeda is perhaps the best personification of the evolution of the terrorist threat to where it currently stands.

Prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001, al Qaeda represented a unitary organization, in many ways similar to other nationalist and anticolonial groups. However, as Bruce Hoffman explains in Inside Terrorism (2006), since 9/11 the group “has transformed itself from a bureaucratic entity that could be destroyed and an irregular army that could be defeated on the battlefield to the clearly less powerful, but nonetheless arguably more resilient, amorphous entity it is today.” In the past, terrorist groups were recognizable mostly as collections of individuals belonging to an organization with a well-defined command and control apparatus. Today's groups, however, are more loosely or indirectly linked through networks of both professionals and “amateurs.”

Nowhere is this cell-based structure more evident than in the rise of the homegrown jihadi movement. Homegrown jihadis are motivated by a shared sense of enmity and grievances toward the West. They may have no formal connections with al Qaeda, but they are nonetheless prepared to carry out attacks in solidarity with the group's radical jihadist agenda. As FBI director Robert Mueller recognized in testimony before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security in September 2009, “the emergence of individuals and groups inspired by al-Qaeda rhetoric but sometimes lacking the capabilities to launch a spectacular, large-scale attack poses a growing Homeland challenge.” What links these groups, more than anything else, is a shared radical Islamist ideology.

In particular, 2009 saw a spike in domestic terrorism plots thwarted within the United States. Demonstrative is the case of Najibullah Zazi, a 25-year-old man who was born in Afghanistan and moved to the United States as a teenager. He lived in Colorado, but then trained in al Qaeda camps and traveled to New York City with the intention of blowing up the city's subway system around the anniversary of 9/11. Following his capture, Zazi pled guilty to the charges. Explaining his justification for the attempted attack, he stated, “It meant that I would sacrifice myself to bring attention to what the U.S. military was doing to civilians in Afghanistan.” Similarly, the shooting by Major Nidal Hassan at Fort Hood, Texas, which killed 13, demonstrated that the threat of domestic radicalization is not simply a problem for American civilians, but also for military personnel.

...