Asymmetrical Warfare

Asymmetries in warfare refer to imbalances between opposing forces. There may be differences in the number of soldiers, equipment, firepower, morale, tactics, values, or other factors. While there has likely never been a conflict between two perfectly symmetrical forces, the term asymmetrical warfare is typically used to mean warfare between two forces that are not simply unequal, but that are so significantly different that they cannot make the same sorts of attacks on each other.

Guerrilla warfare, occurring between lightly armed partisans and a conventional army, is an example of asymmetrical warfare. Terrorist tactics, such as hijackings and suicide bombings, are also considered to be asymmetrical, both because they tend to involve a smaller, weaker group attacking a stronger one, and also because attacks on civilians are by definition one-way warfare. War between a country that is both able and willing to use nuclear weapons and a country that is not would be another example of asymmetrical warfare.

Victory in war does not always go to the militarily superior force: The Revolutionary War between the American colonists and the British, who at the time were a dominant military power, is a clear example of effective asymmetrical warfare. Since World War II, Western powers fighting in developing countries have sometimes been defeated by local forces, despite massive asymmetries in terms of conventional military strength. Colonial powers were forced to withdraw from Algeria, Indochina, Indonesia, and other areas, not as a result of defeat in battle, but because of the lack of will of the dominant power to sustain the war. In Vietnam, the social and political environments at home forced first the French and then the Americans to concede defeat. The insurgents in colonized countries often did not need to defeat the sometimes long-established colonizer, but merely to persuade it to withdraw from the region. Asymmetries of both power and will were operating: the colonial powers possessed superior military resources, but they were reluctant to actually use them.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States found itself with an immense infrastructure and military organized to conduct conventional war, and there was no potential enemy with equivalent military power. The Persian Gulf War, fought in 1991 as a conventional war against Iraq, showcased the military might of the United States to the world. The war was relatively short, relied heavily on technology and firepower, and was won without engaging in much ground combat. The enemy was easy to identify, hostilities generally took place away from inhabited areas, and civilian and U.S. military casualties were few. In Somalia in 1997, by contrast, the United States was involved in a complex mix of humanitarian, police, and military operations, and U.S. forces [Page 71]were not able to take advantage of their military superiority.

Likewise, when the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, the country's conventional forces were defeated within weeks, and the Iraqi ruler, Saddam Hussein, was captured by the end of the year. Nonetheless, a violent insurgency continued for years against U.S. forces in Iraq, unimpaired by the loss of the country's military equipment and bases, and despite the capture and eventual execution of the country's top leader—all factors that would generally cripple a conventional opponent.

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