Asymmetrical Warfare

Asymmetries in warfare refer to imbalances between opposing forces. These may be differences in numbers of soldiers, equipment, firepower, morale, tactics, values, or other factors. Guerrilla warfare, occurring between lightly armed partisans and a conventional army, is an example of asymmetrical warfare. Terrorist tactics, such as hijackings and suicide bombings, are also considered to be asymmetrical, both because they tend to involve a smaller, weaker group attacking a stronger one and because attacks on civilians are by definition one-way warfare.

Victory in war does not always go to the militarily superior force; the Revolutionary War between the Americans and the English is a clear example of effective asymmetrical warfare. Since World War II, Western powers fighting in developing countries have sometimes been defeated by local forces, despite massive asymmetries in terms of conventional military strength. Colonial powers have been forced to withdraw from Algeria, Indochina, Indonesia, and other areas, not as a result of defeat in battle but because of the lack of will of the dominant power to sustain the war. In Vietnam, social and political environments at home forced first the French and then the Americans to concede defeat. Insurgents in colonized countries often did not need to defeat the sometimes long-established colonizer but merely to persuade it to withdraw from the region. Asymmetries of both power and will were operating: the colonial powers possessed superior military resources, but were reluctant to actually use them.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States found itself with an immense infrastructure and military organized to conduct conventional war, and no potential enemy with equivalent military power. The Persian Gulf War, fought in 1991 as a conventional war against Iraq, showcased the military might of the United States to the world. The war was relatively short, relied heavily on technology and firepower, and was won without engaging in much ground combat. The enemy was easy to identify, hostilities generally took place away from inhabited areas, and civilian and U.S. military casualties were few. By contrast, in Somalia, however, where in 1997 the United States was involved in a complex mix of humanitarian, police, and military operations, the United States was not similarly able to take advantage of its military superiority.

The U.S. military is confident in the country's ability to prevail in any conventional conflict, but believes that the United States is vulnerable to [Page 55]“asymmetrical” threats, particularly from terrorist groups. Military authors and experts have variously defined asymmetry, including conflict between different types of forces, for example, air force versus navy, and “not fighting fair.” War involves little that could be considered fair: classic war strategists including Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831) and Sun Tzu (6th century B.C.) have stressed the importance of taking advantage of the enemy's weaknesses.

The 19 flag-draped coffins containing the remains of the U.S. soldiers killed in the bombing of Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia, on June 25, 1996. The coffins lie in a transport at Dover Air Force Base, Delaware, awaiting a memorial service.

Defense Visual Information Center.

In a 2001 report for the Strategic Studies Institute, Stephen Metz and Douglas Johnson suggested that the United States is susceptible to asymmetries of patience, preferring not to fight long wars; asymmetries of will in situations not involving vital national interests; and asymmetries of values, as the United States tends to be unwilling to accept military casualties or inflict civilian casualties. Asymmetrical strategies that could be used against the United States include limiting the fighting to urban areas, attacking the homeland, engaging in political activity designed to discourage potential allies, and using antiaccess strategies, for example, targeting bases, thus limiting ability to mobilize forces.

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