Confessions

Supreme Court rulings concerning how confessions may be obtained or used by law enforcement authorities. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. [Page 79]Constitution protects individuals against self-incrimination: no one “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” No one may be forced to confess, required to testify, or provide evidence that could convict them.

The Court has ruled that only confessions given voluntarily are admissible as evidence. This requirement has long been the rule in federal courts; since 1936, the same rule has applied to state courts. The question is how to determine when a confession is voluntary. In 1884, the Court said that an involuntary confession is one that “appears to have been made … because of a threat or promise … which, operating upon the fears or hopes of the accused … deprive him of that freedom of will or self-control essential to make his confession voluntary within the meaning of the law.”

Delay in charging a suspect with a crime is a significant factor in determining if a confession is admissible. In McNabb v. United States (1943), the Court held that confessions obtained after “unnecessary delay” in a suspect's arraignment could not be used as evidence in federal court.

The Court has also determined that the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel applies to confessions. In Massiah v. United States (1964), the justices declared that an indicted person could not properly be questioned or persuaded to make incriminating remarks in the absence of a lawyer. That same year, in Escobedo v. Illinois, the Court ruled that, in the absence of a lawyer, police must warn suspects of their “absolute constitutional right to remain silent.” Any statements made by a person not so warned are not admissible as evidence. In such a case, the Court considers that the accused has been denied counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment.

Two years after Escobedo, the Court, in Miranda v. Arizona, (1966) set out “concrete constitutional guidelines” for interrogation practices of state and local police. It forbade prosecutors from using incriminating statements obtained from suspects during interrogation unless strict safeguards had been followed to guarantee that the suspect was aware of his or her rights to remain silent and to have the aid of an attorney. “The presence of counsel,” stated Chief Justice Earl Warren, writing for the majority, was “the adequate protective device” to “insure that statements made in the government-established atmosphere are not the product of compulsion.”