Parsons, Talcott

The Theory of Order

Parsons's theory of order starts with his analysis of Hobbes's problem of order in his seminal work, The Structure of Social Action ([1937]1968). Hobbes's question was how social order in the sense of mutually expectable behavior and expectations of two or more actors in a situation is possible under the condition that each actor is free in choosing goals and means to attain his or her goals. Hobbes's prediction for such a situation was the war of all against all (state of nature). According to Hobbes, recognizing this dilemma and striving for survival should suffice to lead everybody to the conclusion of concluding a contract with each other to build a central authority with a monopoly of power, which is in charge of establishing and enforcing rules defining rights and obligations so that social order will be guaranteed. In order to exclude destabilization, the subjects of the authority have no right to resistance, and the founding of the authority in the belief in God's will should help to avoid any questioning of it.

Parsons's criticism of Hobbes's solution says that it leads to the utilitarian dilemma. If there is no precontractual bond between the individuals, there is no reason why they should step out of the situation to see and enact a solution to their problem from the external position of an observer. Within their situation, there is no mutual trust on which to rely in order to conclude a contract that would deprive them of their own sanctioning power. Thus, there are only two extreme solutions to the problem: a very unstable coincidence of interests, which provides for accidental order, or external constraint that produces compulsory order. Both are types of what Parsons calls factual order. Neither type is stable in itself. Accidental order possibly endures for moments of time only, while compulsory order provokes counterforce and is always in danger of resulting in a spiral of force and counterforce. Thus, according to Parsons, a purely positivistic theory of action, which conceives of action as being merely guided by freely chosen goals and means to attain these goals under given external conditions, is unable to provide a satisfying answer to the question of how social order is possible.

It is at this point that Parsons introduces his “normative” solution to the problem of order. He distinguishes normative order from purely factual order in the sense that it relies on precontractual commonly shared values and norms. There must be minimal bonds between people in order to share a minimal set of values and norms. Under this condition, they learn to subordinate their I-perspective to a weperspective and to reconcile individual interests within a common frame of reference. In order to do so, they need to share a feeling of mutual belongingness, which is furthered by external demarcation and minimal internal homogeneity of the society. For Parsons, it goes without saying that such preconditions of commonly shared norms cannot come about by the convergence of individual interests or by external constraint. They follow their own logic of production, namely, external demarcation and internal homogenization; the differentiation between a sacred core of unchangeable values and norms and a profane periphery of changeable technical rules in Durkheim's sense; the recurrent reinforcement and re-creation of the validity of values and norms in commonly shared rituals; inclusion of members in such rituals; the identification of members with the social unit (group, organization, society); socialization of new members through identification with representatives of the social unit; legitimation of more specific norms and practices by reference to more general values and norms. We have to account for these prerequisites as regards the [Page 551]existence of commonly shared values and norms if we want to understand and explain a concretely existing social order.

...