Exchange Coalitions

A coalition is a group of two or more actors (persons, organizations) working collectively against one or more others to gain better outcomes than the outcomes possible through independent action. An exchange network approach to coalitions differs from other coalition approaches by focusing on the structural embeddedness of the causes and consequences of coalition formation. In the coalition studies that permeated social theory during the 1950s and 1960s, the cause of coalition formation (power or resource inequalities) was normally given as initial conditions. In contrast, exchange theories treat initial inequalities as endogenous, determined by actors' locations in social structures.

Given the interrelatedness of coalitions and power, coalition processes figured prominently in early exchange approaches, especially Richard Emerson's work. But there have been relatively few contemporary investigations of coalition processes from an exchange network approach. Some have suggested that the relative absence of work on coalitions can be attributed to contemporary exchange researchers' obstinate focus on developing precise predictions under clearly specified scope conditions. Until recently, this focus has been on predicting structural determinants of power inequalities when actors negotiate independently, thus leaving coalitions (and related forms of collective agency) for future study. Following the development of several highly precise exchange network theories, researchers began to call for a focus on scope extension. These calls resulted in several studies that brought coalitions back in to the study of power and exchange.

In the first empirical study of exchange network coalitions, Cook and Gillmore (1984) tested a key principle of Emerson's work: the likelihood that structurally disadvantaged actors form coalitions is positively related to the level of power inequality in the network. In the experimental test, potential coalition members faced various levels of power disadvantage vis-à-vis the potential coalition target. As predicted, as power inequality increased, so did the frequency of coalition formation. Once formed, coalitions successfully eliminated power inequalities.

Cook and Gillmore's findings underscore early theorists' emphasis on the relation between power and collective action. But their findings may overestimate the ease with which structurally disadvantaged actors can form coalitions to countervail power. One reason is that high-power actors amass resources from repeated instances of power exercise. These resources may then be used to thwart attempts by the less powerful to form coalitions. Subsequent research, however, has focused on a more subtle reason that the Cook-Gillmore findings may evoke undue optimism for low-power actors seeking to countervail power inequalities. In their study, the individual and collective interests of potential coalition members were perfectly aligned; if either of the two low-power participants did not join the coalition, both suffered poor exchange outcomes. These outcomes were considerably improved when both [Page 264]joined. But subsequent research shows that coalition formation in exchange networks, like other forms of collective action, can pose a “social dilemma,” or conflict, between individual and collective interests. This is because successful exchange coalitions can create a niche for “free riding,” or gaining the collective good (better exchange outcomes) without absorbing one's share of the collective costs (sharing profits from exchanges with other coalition members).

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