Constructionism, Social

Social Constructionist Assumptions

Social constructionism cannot be reduced to a fixed set of principles but is more properly considered a continuously unfolding conversation about the nature of knowledge and our understanding of the world. However, several themes are typically located in writings that identify themselves as constructionist. At the outset, it is typically assumed that our accounts of the world—scientific and otherwise—are not dictated or determined in any principled way by what there is. Rather, the terms in which the world is understood are generally held to be social artifacts, products of historically situated interchanges among people. Thus, the extent to which a given form of understanding prevails within a culture is not fundamentally dependent on the empirical validity of the perspective in question but rather on the vicissitudes of social process (e.g., communication, negotiation, communal conflict, rhetoric). This line of reasoning does not at all detract from the significance of various forms of cultural understanding, whether scientific or otherwise. People's constructions of the world and self are essential to the broader practices of a culture—justifying, sustaining, and transforming various forms of conduct. In addition, different communities of meaning making may contribute differentially to the resources available to humankind—whether it be “medical cures,” “moral intelligibilities,” institutionsoflaw, or“reasonstolive.” However, constructionism does challenge the warrant [Page 184]of any group—science included—to proclaim “truth” beyond its perimeters. What is true, real, and good within one tradition may not be within another, and there are no criteria for judging among traditions that are themselves free of traditions, their values, goals, and way of life.

Social Construction and Social Science

The social constructionist views favored by this composite of developments begin to furnish a replacement for traditional empiricist accounts of social science. In the process of this replacement, one may discriminate between two phases, deconstruction and reconstruction. In the former phase, pivotal assumptions of scientific rationality, along with bodies of empirically justified knowledge claims, are placed in question. This work essentially represents an elaboration and extension of the early anti-foundationalist arguments, now informed by the additional developments within the literary and critical domains. Thus, an extensive body of literature has emerged, questioning the warrant and the ideological implications of claims to truth, empirical hypothesis testing, universal rationality, laws of human functioning, the value neutrality of science, the exportation of Western scientific practices, and so on.

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