Reasonable Suspicion

Legal Terms

The use of reasonable suspicion as a standard to justify police intervention initially received official recognition in the U.S. Supreme Court decision Terry v. Ohio, one of a series of opinions issued by the Warren Court as part of the “due process revolution.” This “revolution” refers to the Warren Court's use of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause to place limitations on state actions that interfere with individual rights when they violate federally protected rights considered to be fundamental rights. Accordingly, when the Court determines that a right found in the Bill of Rights is fundamental to the concepts of liberty, that right is “selectively incorporated” into the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. It thus protects these rights from state government interference, just as the Bill of Rights protects them from federal government interference.

So why is this case sociologically intriguing as a social problem and perhaps an example of selective social control? In Terry v. Ohio, the Warren Court was asked to determine “whether it is always unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person and subject him to a limited search for weapons unless there is probable cause for an arrest” under the Fourth Amendment. This legal question arose from the facts of the case. Codefendants Terry and Chilton had been stopped by Cleveland Police Detective Martin McFadden after surreptitious observation. The detective testified that while he was unable to say what initially drew his attention to the defendants, their behavior made him suspicious enough to stop and watch them more closely. In his professional opinion, they exhibited behavior consistent with “casing” the area for an armed robbery. After watching the defendants for a short time, the detective confronted the men, who “mumbled something” in response to his challenge. Officer McFadden then patted down the exterior of Terry's clothing, feeling a pistol in the process. In the search of the second defendant, Chilton, he found another revolver. In the subsequent search of a third man, Katz, he found nothing, and this suspect was ultimately released. Both Chilton and Terry were eventually charged with carrying concealed weapons. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence found in these searches. The motion was not denied because the trial judge agreed with the prosecution's claim that these facts amounted to probable cause; rather, the Supreme Court instead agreed with the trial court's determination that when the police have “reasonable suspicion” that is based on “specific and articulable facts which taken together with rational inferences reasonably warrant that intrusion,” the search does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Further, the Court said that a limited search, or pat-down of the clothing, of the person(s) being stopped is also protected by the Fourth Amendment. Such “frisks” will only be permitted where there is “reasonable suspicion” that the person stopped might be armed and dangerous to the police officer who has stopped them, thereby justifying the search to protect the safety of the officer.

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