Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping as a Solution?

Interpositioning of neutral forces occurred prior to the establishment of the United Nations, whose embryonic peacekeeping role, using military observers, was in the Middle East in 1948. However, “peacekeeping” as a concept, commonly ascribed to former Canadian Foreign Minister Lester B. Pearson, began as a practice with UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold. Although peacekeeping is not specifically mentioned in the UN Charter, Hammarskjold drew upon the principles enshrined therein to handle the Suez crisis in 1956. Although the United Nations set the precedent, the number of peacekeeping operations deployed by non-UN actors exceeds the number of UN operations between 1948 and 2007. Moreover, not all operations mandated through the United Nations have been under UN command. Large international organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), have at times acted on UN mandates as peacekeeping forces.

With few exceptions, operations prior to 1988 were by third-party military contingents, with the majority of interventions handling interstate conflicts by deploying troops to oversee a ceasefire or truce. With the end of the cold war and the increased focus on war-affected populations, peacekeeping operations in new conflict regions entailed additional mandates to handle the social problems created by conflict. Humanitarian emergencies, human rights abuses—including those of women's rights and children's rights—and civilian protection increasingly became questions of international peace and security. Ironically, with the widening of the mandate, more unintended consequences of the operation followed, and the media increasingly brought attention to the problems that peacekeeping in itself can create for the local population.

In the United Nations, the debate on reforming peacekeeping began in the early 1990s, driven foremost by the changing context of peacekeeping operations. Events that spurred the evolution of peacekeeping were operations in Srebrenica (Bosnia-Herzegovina), Somalia, and Rwanda, where deployment into these internal conflicts did not include changing the structure of the missions or securing [Page 653]sufficient resources to implement assignments successfully. Lessons learned involve both the nature of the mandate and rules of engagement, particularly allowing peacekeepers more latitude in the use of force beyond just self-defense. Apart from affecting the efficiency of the mission directly, weaknesses in the operation structure can have an effect on the peacekeeping staff's behavior toward the local population. In addition, a need exists for more integrated missions.

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