Uzbekistan

Religious Affiliations and Human Rights

Muslims are the main religious group with over 90 percent of the population, while Orthodox Christians amount to 5 percent. Yet, Islam in Uzbekistan is far from constituting a unified network. On the contrary, many different types of the Islamic faith are practiced in the nation. During the Communist regime, the Chuguyevka Christians, a group of communal Pentecostals, was established in Uzbekistan and succeeded in establishing ties among its members that survived harsh political persecution. Many new religious movements sent missionaries and members in former Communist states after the fall of the Soviet Union. Uzbekistan was no exception, with the Fellowship of Independent Missionary Community establishing a charter house.

Although the country is officially a democracy, international human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International have denounced the continuous violation of human rights in the country. The Uzbekistan government enforces strict censorship, and alternative ideas cannot be voiced freely. Internet use is heavily censored as well, limiting the opportunities to express ideas and opinions that differ from the official versions.

Clans, Regions, and Loyalties

Scholars are divided on whether to define Uzbek networks in terms of clans, regional areas, or personal interests. These networks are very complex and, according to political scientist Idil Tunçer-Kilavuz, they are based on various loyalties where personal interests play a significant role. The higher one goes in the social hierarchy, the more complex the networks become, and they are often based on patron-client dynamics. Neil Melvin has even claimed that the economic policies of the regime aim at preventing individuals from building an economic base that could allow them to challenge President Islam Karimov. Because there are close links between political backing and business networks, whenever Karimov runs up against a political crisis, the country experiences immediate economic hardship.

The nationalist stress on a unified Uzbekistan that has followed independence from the Soviet Union has proven problematic with the ethnic minorities in the country. The emigration of Uzbeks in neighboring states also makes the nationalist propaganda problematic. The idea of a unified Uzbekistan is just a rhetorical device, as regional conflict remains high and the many different and unofficial Muslim movements could represent a threat to the single-nation idea the regime wants to convey. Islam is deeply rooted in Uzbek society, and Muslim groups represent a legal opportunity for citizens to express their grievances against the government. Uzbeks do not have a corresponding opportunity in secular institutions and may thus be encouraged to affiliate with Islamist groups.

In addition to regional and religious affiliations, some ethnic groups refuse to assimilate into Uzbek society. Crimean Tatars, for example, have constituted a closely knit ethnic network. They are a small Turkic-Muslim group that was forced to leave their homeland in 1944 in Ukraine and relocate to central Asia and, in particular, to Uzbekistan. While Soviet authorities predicted this group would assimilate into their society of exile, Crimean Tatars reacted by constructing a strong sense of belonging with their diasporic members. Since their childhood, they were clearly told by the elders that Uzbekistan was not, and could never be, their homeland. Their real native country was the Crimean Peninsula, where they would be able to return one day. After [Page 921]the disintegration of the Soviet Union, many Crimean Tatars have returned to their motherland.

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