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Positivism is the codeword for a package of philosophical ideas that most likely no one has ever accepted in its entirety. These ideas include a distrust of abstraction, a preference for observation unencumbered by too much theory, a commitment to the idea of a social science that is not vastly different from natural science, and a profound respect for quantification. Like empiricism, to which it is closely related and with which it overlaps to a considerable degree, positivism is the label for a series of claims rather than any single claim. Moreover, many of these claims are analytically separable and do not entail one other so that it is entirely possible to accept some and not the rest. Inevitably, then, it is sometimes difficult to attach the label, without qualification, to any particular position or writer or even to identify the central ideas when several distinct positivisms (12, according to Peter Halfpenny) can be differentiated. But this problem has not prevented some methods writers in the social sciences from referring to positivism as a paradigm, implying that it makes up a quite determinate set of ontological, epistemological, and metaphysical beliefs, all locked together in an unbreakable structure that must, therefore, be rejected or embraced as a whole. This view requires a certain finessing of philosophical history, so this entry will begin with some excerpts from positivism's checkered career before returning to its role in social scientific methodological writing and in particular, its influence on qualitative research. Given that the history of positivism and the history of empiricism are entangled, it might be a good idea to read this entry alongside the corresponding one on empiricism.

Philosophical Positivism

Origins

The term was coined by Auguste Comte, but even for him it has several different connotations. It refers, in part, to a theory of history according to which every branch of knowledge passes through three stages (the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive state—when explanations by appeal to unobservable entities are finally abandoned) and which asserts that improvements in knowledge are responsible for historical progress. For Comte, positivism is also the assertion that there can be a science of society aiming at universal laws akin to those in the natural sciences; the name of a proposed secular religion, involving the worship of society, and with its own priesthood and church; and, less strangely, the label for a unity of science thesis claiming that all the sciences can be integrated into a single system. But perhaps the central thread in Comte's positivism, at least from the point of view of the subsequent history, is its empiricism, the view that the only source of knowledge is experience. This idea is taken from the British empiricists and leads (as it did with John Locke, Bishop Berkeley, and possibly David Hume) to the view that there can be no knowledge of any reality beyond experience. It also led Comte to acknowledge the impossibility of obtaining absolute truth. This knowledge turns out to be a perennial positivist theme and is worth noting in the light of a familiar tendency to claim that positivism involves a commitment to absolute truth as well as knowledge with certainty. At any rate, the pivotal nature of empiricist ideas in positivist thought means that positivism is, in effect, a variant of empiricism.

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