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The central claim of empiricism is that experience is the foundation of knowledge and that the project of gaining access to a reality other than experience is problematic. However, like positivism, a term with which it is closely associated, empiricism has been used to designate different claims and tendencies during its long history, and the concept has evolved to such an extent that those who are now regarded as copybook empiricists—for example, the British empiricist trio of John Locke, Bishop George Berkeley, and David Hume—were strongly inclined to reject that description of themselves. Both terms suffer from radical ambiguity, for just as positivism cannot be identified with a single view uniquely defining a distinctive position, so too is empiricism extremely difficult to pin down precisely, especially as many of the ideas routinely labeled positivist could, with as much or as little justification, be equally described as empiricist. It might, therefore, be sensible to read this entry alongside the corresponding one on positivism.

The entry begins with a review of empiricist ideas in philosophy and then considers the impact of these ideas on the social sciences, specifically the way in which they are reflected in qualitative methods.

Empiricist Claims in Philosophy

Historically, there are a number of beliefs and attitudes that have been attributed to empiricist authors. Most frequently cited, perhaps, is the claim that the only source of knowledge is experience. However, there are ambiguities in this sort of formulation, and it gains in precision only as alternative views are specified and rejected. For example, granted that experience is the only source of knowledge, does an empiricist permit operations to be performed on experience—and, if so, what kind of operations? Some empiricists think that the only permissible type of operation is simple numerical induction; others, such as John Stuart Mill, reject this stringent limitation and argue for more sophisticated inductive methods (including, in Mill's case, the methods of agreement and difference) capable of identifying causes and effects. In Mill's terminology, it is empiricism that he was repudiating, although he took himself to belong to the “school of experience” rather than to the “school of intuition.” The irony is that, according to modern typologies, he would be classed as an empiricist par excellence.

Bacon's Insects

Mill's use was inherited from Francis Bacon, who compared empiricists to ants, “merely collecting and using,” and contrasted them with dogmatists or “spiders” who “spin webs out of themselves.” But according to The Philosophical Works of Francis Bacon, published in 1905, Bacon's preferred insect was the bee, which gathers “flowers from the garden” and then “by her own powers transforms and digests them; and the real work of … [science] is similar” (p. 288). The empiricist tendency to which Bacon metaphorically objected, then, was the mere aggregation of “findings” as opposed to the kind of intellectual work that does something creative with them—although it is equally opposed to dispensing with empirical data in favor of philosophy, dogma, and religion.

Innate Ideas

Next is a claim that differentiated the 17th- and 18th-century British empiricists from the continental rationalists. Locke, for example, argued that the mind is originally a tabula rasa and that all ideas are the result of experience literally imprinting itself on this blank sheet. This is in contrast to Gottfried Leibniz, for example, who believed that the mind is more like a block of marble, with innate ideas already threaded into it and ready to be sculpted by whatever experience brings. This distinction is clearly very different from the one between spiders, ants, and bees. It refers not to any methodological alternatives but rather to a view about the nature of the mind. Moreover, it is clear that the two distinctions are independent of each other; it would not be any more inconsistent for Bacon's ant to believe in innate ideas than for the spider to believe in tabula rasa. This observation anticipates a problem (which is typical of positivism as well as empiricism); the views associated with the label do not necessarily need to belong together. The ant, for example, is an empiricist in Bacon's sense, but not necessarily in Locke's sense.

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