Game Theory

Game theory was introduced to communication research in 1968 and specifically to public relations research in 1987. This theory has proven useful to those working in public relations and to those who build its theories. Game theory and its models help practitioners to enhance their decision-making and relationship-maintenance strategies and skills. Among theorists, game theory's introduction to the public relations literature affected a paradigm clari-fication because it inspired reconceptualization of public relations' normative two-way symmetrical practice model. Consequently, a few researchers have developed contextualized frameworks for analyzing rationality, preferences, and relationship outcomes ranging from conflict to cooperation.

Games is a science metaphor for the wide range of human interactions that depend on how two or more persons directly and strategically relate with one another. This approach to modeling human behavior in terms of outcomes was developed in 1944 by mathematician John von Neumann and mathematical economist Oskar Morgenstern. Game theory has been embraced among social science fields such as communication, psychology, man-agement science, and political science. Rational choice theory provides game theory's foundation, and it has been invoked in debates on complex policy issues such as market competition, arms races, and environmental pollution. Game theory resonates with public relations theory and practice because understanding the balance of influence between an organization and its key publics is central to doing public relations well.

Specifically, game theory has enabled researchers to expand the range of communication behaviors by redefining symmetric communication (games of pure cooperation), which rarely happens in actual public relations practice even though many theorists agree that it is preferable to asymmetric communi-cation (zero-sum games). To illustrate, whereas a three-legged race might be classified as a game of pure cooperation (or non-zero-sum game), a tug of war is a zero-sum game because there is a direct correlation between participants' performance; the better one player does, the worse the other performs incrementally.

Priscilla Murphy (1987; 1989) suggested that public relations theory, like game theory, should avoid binary dualisms that exclude perspectives and limit the full range of possible communication behaviors. Others have concurred, arguing that public relations practice should not be forced to fit into one of four models (press agentry, information, asymmetry, and symmetry) because it is a profession and an arena of academic inquiry that involves many variables and that is complex and dynamic. At [Page 360]times, it may be prudent to maintain some degree of tension (as compared to pure cooperation or total accommodation) among competing interests that are at ideological odds in order to achieve a desired out-come. Therefore, a continuum, rather than a series of models, may offer a more useful heuristic.

Since game theory was introduced to the public relations literature, two-way symmetric communication has been redefined as a “mixed-motive” behav-ior. The mixed-motive framework maintains that while organizations may have asymmetrical self-interest concerns at the core of all behaviors, each is motivated toward cooperation in order to resolve or to reduce some aspects of conflict involved in building relationships with key publics.

In terms of application, game structures have been used to analyze crisis communication issues where stakes are high and timing is key. In the language of game theory, crises are noncooperative games between organizations and publics, such as the duel (Chernobyl explosion in 1986), the tag (Ford Pinto in 1973), escalation (A. H. Robin's Dalkon Shield in 1980s), and cooperative bargaining (Procter & Gamble's Rely tampon recall in 1980). This typology for analyzing organization-stake-holder relationships during or as a result of crises may be used to determine what went wrong and explain why it went wrong. Also, using game theory during strategic planning sessions enables practitioners to confidently examine “what ifs” and “best-worst case scenarios”—as well as to develop strategic alliances and build coalitions. Consequently, the game becomes a negotiation involving commodities, strategic trades, and con-cessions wherein, optimally, there are no clear-cut winners or losers.

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