Competency, Foundational and Decisional

Criteria for Adjudicative Competence

In the United States, individuals accused of crimes are afforded certain constitutional rights and protections during the adjudicatory process. The Fifth Amendment, for example, protects defendants from being compelled by the state to testify against themselves. The Sixth Amendment provides defendants with the right to the assistance of legal counsel, the right to confront their accusers and the evidence against them, and the right to a trial by jury. To benefit from these rights, defendants must be mentally able to assert them. It is not enough that defendants be physically present during adjudicatory proceedings; they must also have the mental capacity to exercise their rights—that is, they must be “competent.”

When questions are raised about a defendant's competence, it is the responsibility of the trial judge to make an inquiry and determine whether he or she has the requisite abilities to go forward to adjudication. The broad criteria for adjudicative competence were [Page 106]articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Dusky v. United States (1960). The trial judge must determine “whether the defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.”

Careful scrutiny of this “test” for legal competence reveals several important features:

• 1.
  A defendant does not have to be completely competent. Only sufficient abilities are required (and these may vary with the complexity and demands of the case).
• 2.
  Adjudicative competence is concerned with present mental capacities. It is arguably irrelevant that a defendant had significant mental impairment at some point in the past or may again experience such difficulties in the distant future (the current inquiry does assume that present capacities are likely to be maintained in the near future during the course of the pending proceedings). In particular, adjudicative competence is distinguished from inquiries related to legal insanity, a retrospective judgment as to the defendant's mental state at the time of the offense.
• 3.
  Adjudicative competence is about ability or capacity. A defendant who is ignorant (e.g., lacks present factual understanding of the legal proceedings) may still be competent if it is determined that he or she is intellectually able to assimilate the relevant information (e.g., through education by or consultation with the attorney). Similarly, a voluntary unwillingness or reluctance (e.g., due to bad character or attitude) to perform the required legal tasks (e.g., to consult with one's attorney) is not a basis for a finding of incompetence.
• 4.
  The criteria are functional legal abilities. The mere presence of symptoms of mental disorder, even if substantial in nature, is not sufficient to render a defendant legally incompetent. There must be a further showing that the mental disorder adversely affects the abilities articulated in Dusky (i.e., to assist counsel, to factually or rationally understand the proceedings).

Societal Values and Competency

For the state to proceed against a defendant who is incompetent affronts important societal values that the constitutional rights were intended to protect. One important value is the dignity of the process; it offends the moral dignity of society for the state to proceed against an individual, whose liberty (and in capital cases, life) is at stake, when that individual is not capable of competent participation in the adversary proceedings. Proceeding against an individual who is “defenseless” due to mental incapacity conjures notions of a “kangaroo court” and conflicts with fundamental notions of fairness.

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