Risk and Prevention in Work and Organizational Settings

Introduction

Occupational safety thinking has undergone considerable extensions of scope during the last years. The focus shifted from personal characteristics as source of risk to the influence of work place as source of risk to organizational factors (Sheehy & Chapman, 1987). Prevention of occupational accidents and safeguarding of employee health as well as protection of environment have become [Page 830]critical elements within a holistic framework of comprehensive ‘integrated safety management’ strategies (Zimolong, 1996). According to Hoyos and Ruppert (1993) safety can be achieved through joint and continuous efforts of management and employees in conjunction with requisite technical installations and safeguards. Thus, attention is directed to aspects of the encompassing organizational system instead of only focusing on individual workers and their work place but it remains centred on the focal organization.

Concepts in this field mainly theorize unsafe behaviour of single persons, either from a cognitive, motivational or learning perspective. Cognitive models of unsafe or risk-taking behaviour assume that people have a target level of risk to which they adapt their individual behaviour like in the risk homeostasis theory (Wilde, 1982), or that people act not as decision makers that makes them run risks (Wagenaar, 1992). According to Trimpop (1996) the motivation to perform safely is mainly influenced by three motives: to prevent a personal injury, to minimize efforts for work and to design work variable. People then calculate cost and benefits of future behaviour including emotional as well as cognitive aspects. Learning theories (Musahl, 1996) centre past behaviour, the probability of unsafe behaviour in the future increases as long as unsafe behaviour in the past did not lead to accidents. Recent models are expanded to organizational factors assuming that working conditions themselves can lead to accidents or increase the accident risk by so called error enforcing conditions (Reason, 1990).

Feed-forward strategies are mainly based on risk or hazard assessment. Feedback strategies are mainly based on accident and injury rates gathered from insurance statistics. An accident is often defined by three or more days of absence from work. Less than three days is defined as near-accident and usually no report has to be submitted.

Prevention strategies either focus on the individual, as personnel selection, training, and certain reward systems, or on ergonomic design. Münsterberg's early attempts to reduce accidents of ‘motormen in street railway transportation’ (Münsterberg, 1913: 63) and later of ship officers through respective selection techniques based on laboratory experiments are well known early approaches to occupational accident prevention. Another example of selection methods is the cognitive failure questionnaire (Broadbent, 1982), developed to detect accident-prone people. Empirical data again do not show definite results (Klumb, 1995). Training methods for safe behaviour aim at behavioural change through extending knowledge or competence as safety talks and safety discussion do (Fahlbruch, 1998). Reward systems aim either at the individual or a team, examples are bonus systems related to safety competitions among different work units. Preventions that aim at improving the ergonomic design state a priority of collective protection over an individual one. Other kinds of intervention focus on participation of workers in quality or safety circles. Recently the institutionalization of safety management systems or integrated HSE management systems is asked for. The perceived importance of leadership for safety leads to the involvement of managers and supervisors as well as to specific training for the management (Zimolong, 1995).

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