Free Riding

Historical Background

Although analysis of the relationship between individual action and societal outcomes has a long [Page 288]philosophical tradition, economists and sociologists such as Vilfredo Pareto, Paul Samuelson, and Max Weber were among the first modern scholars to formally articulate the potential for free riding, as well as other similar forms of social inaction, to undercut various societal and market processes. In an influential 1965 book, Mancur Olson provided an economic analysis of how large collectives can lead individuals to view their contributions to the collective as mostly or entirely unnecessary, leading to disinterest and apathy.

Specifically, individuals are likely to view their own contributions to an outcome or public good that is provided by many such individuals as at best minuscule, and perhaps as entirely unnecessary. Stated differently, individuals may reason that if they do not provide the requisite effort or resources, others are likely to sustain the resource anyhow; thus, they may therefore simply choose to “let George do it.” The likelihood of being able to continue to benefit from a pooled resource with many contributors may be nearly as high when one makes little or no contribution as when one makes a full or even exceptional contribution.

Olson noted that such free riding becomes increasingly likely as the size of the group increases, both because individual actions are less immediately noticeable in larger groups and because individuals are likely to view their collective actions as being efficacious in larger groups. As group size increases, the costs of organizing individual contributions or efforts are also likely to increase, providing another possible mechanism for individual inaction. Other factors influencing individual action include the level of public interest about specific causes, the presence of coercion or special incentives to participate, the nature of the task, and individual differences in factors such as value orientation (a habitual tendency to value the self or others) and fairness perceptions.

Consider a political election as an example. As the potential voting base increases in size, it becomes increasingly likely that each individual voter will have less impact on the outcome, that each individual will see less efficacy to his or her vote, and that it will be increasingly difficult logistically to organize voter participation in an effective manner. Yet, if public interest in the election and in issues central to the election is high, if the anticipated outcome is expected to be very close (thereby increasing the potential value of each vote), or if voters are influenced by potential rewards from friends, political organizations, or community groups (or otherwise fearful of negative reactions from these sources that could result from not voting), individual inaction will be less likely. Similarly, individuals with a vested interest in specific election-related issues or who view themselves as socially responsible might also be more likely to participate.

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