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The commons dilemma is a specific class of social dilemma in which people's short-term selfish interests are at odds with longterm group interests. The commons dilemma, also known as the common pool resource (CPR), the resource dilemma, or the take-some dilemma, was inspired by the metaphor of the Tragedy of the Commons that Garrett Hardin discussed in his seminal 1968 Science article. This story describes a group of herders with open access to a common parcel of land on which to let their cows graze. It is in each herder's interest to put as many cows as possible onto the land, even if the commons is damaged as a result. The herder receives all the benefits from the additional cows, but the damage to the commons is shared by the entire group. Yet if all herders make this individually rational decision, the commons is destroyed and all will suffer.

The commons dilemma stands as a model for a great variety of resource problems in society today, such as water, land, fish, and nonrenewable energy sources like oil and coal. When water is used at a higher rate than the reservoirs are replenished, fish consumption exceeds its reproductive capacity, or oil supplies are exhausted, we face a tragedy of the commons.

In the 1980s, researchers created an experimental game version of the commons dilemma involving a common resource pool (filled with money or points that could be converted into money or lottery tickets) from which a group of individuals could harvest. If the sum of their harvests per round of the game is lower than the replenishment rate, the pool is maintained. The individuals are each tempted to harvest as much as possible, but if they do, all suffer and the resource is depleted, upon which the game ends.

Factors Promoting Conservation in Commons Dilemmas

Commons dilemma researchers have studied conditions under which groups and communities are likely to under- or overharvest the common resource in both the laboratory and field. Research programs have concentrated on a number of motivational, strategic, and structural factors that might be conducive to commons management.

Motivational Solutions

The research shows that some people are more motivated than others to manage the common resource responsibly. Using the commons dilemma game, researchers found that people with prosocial value orientations harvest less from a resource during a period of scarcity. Prosocial individuals are also more inclined to engage in sustainable environmental behaviors such as taking public transportation (instead of the car) and conserving energy and water, as well as to explain their decisions in terms of environmental impact.

Motivation to conserve a common resource is also promoted by people's group ties. When people identify with their group, they are more likely to exercise personal restraint, as well as to compensate for greedy harvest decisions of ingroup members more than for those of outgroup members. Similarly, in the field strongly knit communities are usually better at managing resource shortages than communities with weak social ties. It might be that group identity promotes a longterm perspective on resource management that makes it easier for people to sacrifice their immediate interest on behalf of their local community. It could also be that group identification increases the social interdependencies between community members so that they care more for the social rewards and punishments of their community. This needs further investigation.

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