Skip to main content icon/video/no-internet

Within the juvenile justice system there is a category of offenses known as status offenses. These are offenses that apply to youths; that is, if they were to be committed by an adult, they would not be considered criminal. The following offenses are usually included within the status offense category: (1) running away, (2) truancy, (3) curfew violation, and (4) a catch-all category of behavior known variously as “incorrigible,” “unmanageable,” “beyond control,” and the like. In some states, offender categories like PINS (persons in need of supervision) and CHINS (children in need of supervision) are substituted for the offense categories.

Some states, such as Montana, have statutes where incorrigibility is subsumed under YINS (youth in need of supervision), which is defined as a child who “habitually disobeys the reasonable and lawful demands of his [or her] parents or guardian, or is ungovernable and beyond their control” (Bortner, 1988, p. 96). In other states, a child who “is in danger of leading an idle or immoral life,” who is a “wayward child,” who “endangers the morals of himself or others,” or “who associates with vagrant, vicious or immoral persons” can be brought before the juvenile court (Bortner, 1988, pp. 98–100).

Status offenders are often treated more harshly than their more delinquent counterparts. Throughout the history of the juvenile justice system, a large percentage of those detained and committed to institutions have been status offenders, often reaching as many as one-fourth or more of the total population. Recent figures show that while the percentages of those detained and committed to juvenile training schools who are status offenders has declined in recent years, these offenders nevertheless constitute a significant proportion of the incarcerated youth in the United States.

Status offenses have generated a great deal of debate over the years. Many have charged that they should be ruled unconstitutional on the grounds of “void for vagueness.” It is, after all, difficult to determine precisely the meaning of “habitual disobedience,” “lawful parental demands,” or “being in danger of leading an idle or immoral life.” More specifically, many feel that these laws violate the Eighth Amendment, because punishment ensues from status rather than behavior. Still another argument is that such laws deny children equal protection because they apply only to children. Further, it is proposed that status offenders are denied due process in that they are deprived of liberty “in the name of treatment” (Bearrows, 1987, pp. 184–185).

Gender

The early history of the juvenile court reveals a large discrepancy between the treatment of status offenders and those who committed regular crimes, especially when the offenders were girls. Studies of early juvenile court activity reveal that nearly all of the girls who appeared in these courts were charged with the specific status offenses of “immorality” or “waywardness.” The sanctions for such misbehavior were extremely severe. For example, the Chicago Family Court sent half the girl delinquents but only a fifth of the boy delinquents to reformatories between 1899 and 1909. In Milwaukee, twice as many girls as boys were committed to training schools. In Memphis, females were twice as likely as males to be committed to training schools.

...

  • Loading...
locked icon

Sign in to access this content

Get a 30 day FREE TRIAL

  • Watch videos from a variety of sources bringing classroom topics to life
  • Read modern, diverse business cases
  • Explore hundreds of books and reference titles

Sage Recommends

We found other relevant content for you on other Sage platforms.

Loading