Wolfers, Arnold (1892—1968)

More than 40 years after his death, Arnold Wolfers remains one of the most influential experts in the field of international relations. Some of his most important insights were derived from his analysis of the quest for power, which he associated with the realist school in international relations. Wolfers contrasted this approach with indifference to power, which he linked to certain representatives of the idealist school. He made it clear to readers where he came down on the realist-idealist continuum, noting that world affairs are heavily slanted toward struggles for power. But he also criticized the realists for giving insufficient attention to “the policy goals from whence this quest for power springs” (1962, pp. 81—102).

This last comment alerts readers to a major theme in Wolfers's writings—his claim that in almost all circumstances power is a means to an end rather than an end in itself.

To treat the quest for power, positively or negatively, outside of the context of ends and purposes which it is expected to serve, therefore, robs it of any intelligible meaning and also makes it impossible to judge its appropriateness or excessiveness. (1962, p. 89)

Wolfers was a reluctant realist: he accepted that as a result of the relationship of major tensions in [Page 714]the international system governments usually felt compelled to pursue power in the service of national security. But he also encouraged leaders to be constantly aware of the costs and risks associated with the quest for power. He placed special emphasis on the fact that a nation's efforts to enhance security were almost always at the expense of other national values. He also warned policy makers that the quest for power in the service of national security can be self-defeating if “the efforts of one side provoke counter-measures by the other” (1962, pp. 158—159).

Wolfers also stressed the point that, as a rule, not survival but other national interests are at stake in international politics. This left a wide area of opportunity for mutual accommodation between states. It also meant that leaders had to be careful about when they chose to use power (which he defined as the ability to move others by the threat or infliction of deprivations) and when it was more appropriate to rely upon influence (which he defined as the ability to use power through promises or grants of benefits). It is not surprising, then, that he focused much of his writing on the role of diplomacy in world affairs, even though he recognized that coercive power in the background usually deserves a major part of the credit for successful negotiation.