Throffers

The term throffer was coined by Hillel Steiner to characterize an intervention that simultaneously constitutes a threat and an offer. “If you fail to do this job for me, I'll kill you” is an example of a threat. “Do this job for me and I'll give you a thousand dollars” is an example of an offer. A throffer that combined these two interventions would be: “Do this job and I'll give you a thousand dollars; fail to do so and I'll kill you.”

When agent A makes agent B do something that B would not otherwise have done by threatening to impose a negative sanction should B not comply, A exercises power over B by inverting B's preference order with respect to doing and not doing that thing. This inversion of B's preference order is effected by A's attaching a cost (for B) to the consequences of B's not complying with A's desire, lowering the overall attractiveness (for B) of this course of action to a level below that of the consequences of compliance. Offers, like threats, constitute successful exercises of power by A over B when they invert the preference order of B with respect to doing and not doing what A desires. The only difference is that they do so by attaching a benefit to the consequences of compliance, increasing their overall degree of attractiveness for B to a level above that of the consequences of noncompliance.

A throffer does both of these things: it decreases the desirability for B of the consequences of non-compliance while also increasing the desirability for B of those of compliance. For this reason, throffers are, other things being equal, more powerful interventions than either threats or offers, in the sense of being more effective in inducing B to perform actions that comply with A's desires.

The degree of power of an intervention (a threat, an offer, or a throffer) depends only on the size of the difference in degree of desirability that it succeeds in effecting between the consequences of compliance and those of noncompliance. Thus, as Steiner notes, there is no conceptual entailment between an intervention being of a certain kind (a threat, an offer, or a throffer) and its degree of power. For example, the offer “Do this job and I'll give you a million dollars” is almost certainly more powerful than the threat “Fail to do this job and I'll stand on your foot.” Nevertheless, A's adding an effective offer to an effective threat, or vice versa, will always increase the power with which A induces B to comply.