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Systematic Luck
Systematic luck can be defined as consistently getting what is in one's interests because of the way society is structured, and getting this without being decisive. The term was first introduced in Keith Dowding's book Rational Choice and Political Power to explain why some groups tend to get their desired outcomes more often than their resources indicate they should. Their resources might give them the ability to get what they want if they act, but they also might get what they want anyway, without their actions decisively altering the outcome. This is a simple case of luck. The idea that grounds systematic luck is that the luck enjoyed in society is not altogether arbitrary. The reason for getting what one wants without trying is a systematic reason if it is tied to the social location one finds oneself in. Whether an actor is a capitalist, laborer, consumer, producer, developer, bureaucrat, slave, or president, if that position grants what is wanted more often than should expected by a combination of natural luck, resources, and intentional action, then the actor may be thought of as systematically lucky.
Dowding coined the term systematic luck for two reasons. The first was to defend a structural account of power that did not lead to a thesis of radical determinism. Dowding argues that power is based on the resources an actor can command. If an actor's resources indicate what he or she has the power to do, and if we equate power with success, then we should be able to determine how successful the actor will be. Here we have a thesis of radical determinism: one's resources determine one's success. This is not always the case, though, because some actors might be successful without having much in the way of resources, or even without acting at all. Two gold miners who command the same equipment and the same capacity to work might have varying degrees of success. What separates them is their brute luck. Luck is a theoretical concept used to explain this indeterminacy between power and success. It is not something that can be measured by empirical researchers: we can empirically measure resources—we can measure the wealth, income, education, and the reputation of actors—but there is no single empirical phenomenon that directly indicates luck. Positing luck as an explanatory device is one way to measure power without leading to radical determinacy.
Luck, as an explanatory term, must be refined to systematic luck when we think of power in the structural sense. Actors use social resources (as opposed to the natural resources of the miners) to entice other actors to behave in preferable ways. Social resources can be defined as means of enticement, and so must have value to other actors (as objects of want or respect). Governments, for instance, desire to develop their economies to secure the well-being of their populace, and so provide incentives such as low tax rates and less regulation to entice the investment of capital, which will often lead to more jobs and a better standard of living—one of the more valuable social resources. Capitalists who are already part of the economy gain from the low tax rates. They are simply lucky that the government's interests are in line with their own. It is the government that is utilizing resources (its legitimate authority) to bring about the mutually beneficial outcome, not the capitalists. This is luck in a systematic sense. Social resources are relatively enduring; there are few incentives for anyone who has power to change the allocation of resources, because the very reason they have this power is because of their resources. For example, a government has little incentive to change its status as a legitimate authority. Because resources are enduring, so too are the power structures that go with them. A government's legitimate authority is usually maintained by protecting the well-being of its community; this well-being, it is often said, requires economic growth. These structures constitute the social system. Therefore, the kind of luck applicable to a regular beneficiary of this system is systematic luck.
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- Adler, Alfred
- Adorno, Theodor
- Althusser, Louis
- Arendt, Hannah
- Aristotle
- Bachrach, Peter, and Baratz, Morton
- Bakunin, Mikhail
- Barry, Brian
- Bourdieu, Pierre
- Bull, Hedley
- Carr, E. H.
- Cartwright, Dorwin
- Castells, Manuel
- Clausewitz, Carl von
- Clegg, Stewart
- Coleman, James S.
- Cox, Robert W.
- Dahl, Robert A.
- Deutsch, Karl
- Domhoff, G. William
- Dowding, Keith
- Eagly, Alice
- Felsenthal, Dan S.
- Fiske, Susan
- Flyvbjerg, Bent
- Foucault, Michel
- French, John R. P., Jr.
- Giddens, Anthony
- Gramsci, Antonio
- Granovetter, Mark
- Habermas, Jürgen
- Hall, Judith A.
- Harsanyi, John C.
- Haugaard, Mark
- Hobbes, Thomas
- Holler, Manfred
- Hunter, Floyd
- Jessop, Bob
- Jost, John
- Kropotkin, Peter
- Laclau, Ernesto, and Mouffe, Chantal
- Lasswell, Harold
- Lewin, Kurt, and Power
- Luhmann, Niklas
- Lukes, Steven
- Machiavelli, Niccolò
- Machover, Moshé
- Mann, Michael
- Marx, Karl
- McClelland, David
- Michels, Robert
- Miliband, Ralph
- Mills, C. Wright
- Morgenthau, Hans J.
- Morriss, Peter
- Nietzsche, Friedrich
- Parsons, Talcott
- Poulantzas, Nicos
- Raven, Bertram
- Riker, William H.
- Sabatier, Paul
- Scott, James
- Spence, Janet
- Sprout, Harold
- Waltz, Kenneth
- Weber, Max
- Wight, Martin
- Wolfers, Arnold
- Wright, Quincy
- Ability
- Ableness
- Absolutism
- Adverse Selection
- Agency
- Agenda Power
- Agenda Setters
- Argument, Power of
- Authority
- Autonomy
- Bargaining
- Blackmail
- Bureaucratic Power
- Cabal
- Capability
- Capital, Marxist
- Causation
- Coercion, Analytic
- Coercion and Power
- Collective Action Problem
- Complex Equality (Walzer)
- Consent
- Control
- Cooperation
- Coordination
- Corruption
- Decentering (of Subject, of Structure)
- Deflected Wants
- Deliberation
- Determinacy
- Determinism
- Discipline
- Discourse
- Dispositif
- Domain
- Domination
- Entrepreneurs
- Exclusion
- Exercise Fallacy
- Exit and Voice as Forms of Power
- Expectancy Confirmation, Power and
- Exploitation
- Fair Division
- False Consciousness
- Fear, Use of
- Female Leadership Among Mammals
- Free Market
- Free Will
- Freedom
- Governmentality
- Habitus
- Hegemony
- Hierarchy
- Ideas
- Ideology
- Influence
- Interests
- Invisible Hand
- Leadership
- Legitimation
- Loyalty
- Luck
- Luck, Brute
- Manipulation
- Mechanisms
- Mobilization of Bias
- Moral Hazard
- Networks and Communities
- Nonverbal Communication and Power
- Opportunity
- Perceptual Symbols of Power
- Persuasion
- Pluralism
- Policy Entrepreneurs
- Political Thinking as Power
- Power Elite
- Power Motive
- Propaganda
- Public Goods
- Racism, Role of Power in
- Rationality
- Relative Autonomy of the State
- Responsibility
- Rhetoric
- Scope
- Second Face
- Social Capital
- Submissive
- Subordination
- Systematic Luck
- Systemic Power
- Third Face
- Threats
- Throffers
- Trade
- Trust
- Unintended Consequences
- Vehicle Fallacy
- Will to Power
- Agenda Power
- Agenda Setters
- Banzhaf Value
- Banzhaf Voting Power Measure
- Bargaining
- Blocking Coalition
- Bribe Index
- Chicken Games
- Coalition Theory
- Coleman, James S.
- Coleman Index
- Computer Algorithms for Power Indices
- Core of a Game
- Dowding, Keith
- Fair Division
- Felsenthal, Dan S.
- Game Forms, Power in
- Game-Theoretical Approaches to Power
- Grand Coalition
- Gunboat Diplomacy
- Harsanyi, John C.
- Holler, Manfred
- Homogeneous Weighted Majority Games
- I-Power
- Jurisdictions and Structure-Induced Equilibria
- Machover, Moshé
- Martin Index
- Minimal Winning Coalition
- Mutually Assured Destruction
- Non Decision Making
- Noncooperative Games
- Owen Value
- Paradox of New Members
- Parties, Policy-Seeking Versus Power-Seeking
- Penrose Voting Power Measure
- Pivot Player
- Power Indices
- Power Laws
- Power to Initiate Action and Power to Prevent Action
- P-Power
- Preference Versus Nonpreference-Based Concepts
- Proper Simple Game
- Public Goods Index
- Qualified Majority Voting
- Quarreling Paradox
- Shapley Value
- Shapley—Shubik Index
- Shareholder Voting Power
- Simple Games
- Small Worlds, Power in
- Spatial Voting Analysis
- Square Root Rules
- Strategic Power Index
- Tijs Value
- U.S. Electoral College, Power in
- Value of a Game
- Variable-Sum Games
- Veto Players
- Veto Power
- Voting Paradoxes
- Voting Power
- Weighted Majority Game
- Weighted Voting
- Agenda Power
- Agenda Setters
- Bicameral Legislature
- Budget-Maximizing Bureaucrats
- Bureaucratic Power
- Capture Theory of Regulation
- Central Intelligence Agency
- Corporatism
- Dominant Parties
- e-Governance
- Elections
- Federal Structure
- Internet and Power
- Leadership
- Media, The
- Organization of the State
- Political Parties
- Prime Ministerial and Presidential
- Principal-Agent Relationship
- Prisoner's Dilemma
- Referendums
- Structure-Induced Equilibrium
- Unicameral Legislature
- U.S. Electoral College, Power in
- Alliances
- Anarchy in International Relations
- Appeasement
- Arms Race
- Balance of Power
- Banks
- Bargaining in International Relations
- Bull, Hedley
- Carr, E. H.
- Cartwright, Dorwin
- Chicken Games
- Civil War
- Clausewitz, Carl von
- Compliance (International)
- Constructivist View of Power in International Relations
- Conventional Deterrence
- Cox, Robert W.
- Cuban Missile Crisis
- Defensive Realism
- Dependency Theory in International Relations
- Deterrence Theory
- Deterrent Threats
- Deutsch, Karl
- Diplomacy
- Empire
- Environmental Treaties
- Espionage
- Executive Power
- Extended Deterrence
- Feminist International Relations, View of Power
- First-Strike Capability
- Gunboat Diplomacy
- Hegemonic Power
- Hegemonic War
- Hegemony
- Idealism in International Relations
- Imperial Power
- Imperialism
- Intelligence
- Lasswell, Harold
- League of Nations
- Military in Government
- Morgenthau, Hans J.
- Multinational Corporations
- Mutually Assured Destruction
- Neoliberalism
- Neorealism
- Offense/Defense Dominance
- Postmodernist View of Power in International Relations
- Power Transition Theory
- Realism in International Relations
- Regime Theory in International Relations
- Sea Power
- Security
- Security Dilemma
- Separation of Powers
- Sovereignty
- Spiral Model
- Sprout, Harold
- Strategic Interaction in International Relations
- Terror Regimes
- Terrorism
- Waltz, Kenneth
- War
- Wight, Martin
- Wolfers, Arnold
- Wright, Quincy
- Agency-Structure Problem
- Authority
- Caste System (India)
- Chicken Games
- Deliberative Democracy
- Gender, Role of Power in
- Heterosexism, Role of Power in
- Hierarchy
- Interdependence Theory
- Leadership and Gender
- Power as Control Theory
- Psychological Empowerment
- Submissive
- Veiled Women
- Agency
- Agency-Structure Problem
- Autonomy
- Bases of Power
- Free Will
- Gender, Role of Power in
- Interdependence Theory
- Leadership and Gender
- Psychological Empowerment
- Submissive
- Agency-Structure Problem
- Bachrach, Peter, and Baratz, Morton
- Barry, Brian
- Bourdieu, Pierre
- Community Power Debate
- Consensual Power, Theories of
- Critical Theory
- Dahl, Robert A.
- Defensive Realism
- Deliberative Democracy
- Dependency Theory in International Relations
- Discourse
- Domhoff, G. William
- Domination
- Dowding, Keith
- Elite Theories
- Essentially Contested Concept
- Free Will
- Freedom
- Global Governance
- Hunter, Floyd
- Liberalism
- Luck
- Miliband, Ralph
- Miliband-Poulantzas Debate
- Mills, C. Wright
- Mobilization of Bias
- Neoliberalism
- Neorealism
- Non Decision Making
- Organization of the State
- Pluralism
- Postmodernist View of Power in International Relations
- Poulantzas, Nicos
- Power as Control Theory
- Power Elite
- Power To and Power Over
- Psychological Empowerment
- Queer Theories of Power
- Rationality
- Realism in International Relations
- Regime Theory in International Relations
- Regime Theory in Urban Politics
- Relative Autonomy of the State
- Resources as Measuring Power
- Second Face
- Social Dominance Theory
- Spiral Model
- Structural Power
- Structural Suggestion
- Structuration
- Three Faces of Power
- Transactional and Transformational Leadership
- Adverse Selection
- Agency-Structure Problem
- Community Power Debate
- Essentially Contested Concept
- Exercise Fallacy
- False Consciousness
- Fungibility of Power Resources
- Mechanisms
- Pluralism
- Power Elite
- Power Laws
- Preference Versus Nonpreference-Based Concepts
- Principal-Agent Relationship
- Rationality
- Realism in International Relations
- Realist Accounts of Power
- Reputational Analysis
- Resources as Measuring Power
- Systematic Luck
- Third Face
- Three Faces of Power
- Agenda Power
- Agenda Setters
- Authority
- Banzhaf Value
- Bicameral Legislature
- Budget-Maximizing Bureaucrats
- Bureaucratic Power
- Business and Power
- Capital, Marxist
- Capital, Neoclassical
- Capture Theory of Regulation
- Central Intelligence Agency
- Civil War
- Coalition Theory
- Collective Action Problem
- Community Power Debate
- Core Parties
- Corporatism
- Coup d'État
- Dahl, Robert A.
- Democracy
- Dictatorship
- Dominant Parties
- Dowding, Keith
- e-Governance
- Elections
- Executive Power
- Fascism
- Federal Structure
- Global Governance
- Globalization
- Governmentality
- Grand Coalition
- Growth Coalitions
- Heresthetics
- Hierarchy
- Hunter, Floyd
- Intelligence
- Internet and Power
- Jursidictions and Structure-Induced Equilibria
- Lasswell, Harold
- Leadership
- Legislative Power
- Liberalism
- Lukes, Steven
- Martin Index
- McClelland, David
- Michels, Robert
- Military in Government
- Mills, C. Wright
- Minimal Winning Coalition
- Morriss, Peter
- Nationalism
- Organization of the State
- Parties, Policy-Seeking Versus Power-Seeking
- Parties, Strong and Very Strong
- Pivotal Politics
- Pluralism
- Police State
- Policy Entrepreneurs
- Political Parties
- Post-Fordism
- Power Elite
- Power To and Power Over
- Prime Ministerial and Presidential
- Principal-Agent Relationship
- Realist Accounts of Power
- Referendums
- Relative Autonomy of the State
- Revolution
- Revolutionary Cell Structure
- Right-Wing Authoritarianism
- Riker, William H.
- Riots
- Second Face
- Social Capital
- Social Power
- Spatial Voting Analysis
- Structural Power
- Structural Suggestion
- Structure-Induced Equilibrium
- Terror Regimes
- Terrorism
- Testosterone, Power and
- Totalitarianism
- Unicameral Legislature
- U.S. Electoral College, Power in
- Veiled Women
- Veto Players
- Vote-Maximizing Parties
- Voting
- Voting Paradoxes
- Voting Power
- Weber, Max
- Weighted Voting
- Women as Political Leaders
- Agency-Structure Problem
- Anarchism, Power in
- Authority
- Barry, Brian
- Bourdieu, Pierre
- Capital, Marxist
- Capital, Neoclassical
- Castells, Manuel
- Deliberative Democracy
- Democracy
- Dispositif
- Distributive Justice
- Domhoff, G. William
- Dowding, Keith
- Freedom
- Global Governance
- Globalization
- Governmentality
- Gramsci, Antonio
- Habermas, Jürgen
- Hobbes, Thomas
- Hunter, Floyd
- Jessop, Bob
- Justice
- Liberalism
- Lukes, Steven
- Machiavelli, Niccolò
- Marx, Karl
- Michels, Robert
- Miliband, Ralph
- Mills, C. Wright
- Morriss, Peter
- Nationalism
- Nietzsche, Friedrich
- Paternalism
- Pluralism
- Political Legitimacy
- Post-Fordism
- Poulantzas, Nicos
- Power Elite
- Power To and Power Over
- Power With
- Sabatier, Paul
- Scott, James
- Second Face
- Social Capital
- Social Power
- Sovereignty
- Structural Power
- Structural Suggestion
- Will to Power
- Adler, Alfred
- Authoritarian Personality
- Bases of Power
- Deflected Wants
- Eagly, Alice
- Expectancy Confirmation, Power and
- Fiske, Susan
- Framing
- French, John R. P., Jr.
- Granovetter, Mark
- Groupthink
- Hall, Judith A.
- Human Dominance Motivation
- Interdependence Theory
- Jost, John
- Laclau, Ernesto, and Mouffe, Chantal
- Lewin, Kurt, and Power
- Power, Cognition, and Behavior
- Power as Control Theory
- Power Motive
- Psychological Empowerment
- Rationality
- Raven, Bertram
- Social Dominance Theory
- Status
- Striving for Superiority
- System Justification Theory
- Transactional and Transformational Leadership
- Agency
- Agency-Structure Problem
- Biopower
- Caste System (India)
- Clegg, Stewart
- Decentering (of Subject, of Structure)
- Deliberation
- Flyvbjerg, Bent
- Foucault, Michel
- Free Will
- Giddens, Anthony
- Governmentality
- Groupthink
- Habermas, Jürgen
- Habitus
- Haugaard, Mark
- Jessop, Bob
- Luhmann, Niklas
- Lukes, Steven
- Mann, Michael
- Michels, Robert
- Miliband, Ralph
- Mills, C. Wright
- Morriss, Peter
- Nationalism
- Parsons, Talcott
- Perceptual Symbols of Power
- Post-Fordism
- Propaganda
- Rationality
- Realist Accounts of Power
- Revolution
- Rhetoric
- Right-Wing Authoritarianism
- Scott, James
- Second Face
- Small Worlds, Power in
- Social Breakdown
- Social Capital
- Substructure and Superstructure
- Status
- Strength of Weak Ties
- Structural Power
- Structural Suggestion
- Structuration
- Trust
- Veiled Women
- Weber, Max
- Will to Power
- Animal Groups, Power in
- Causal Theories of Power
- Coercion and Power
- Collective Action Problem
- Community Power Debate
- Elite Theories
- Exchange Theory
- Feminist International Relations, View of Power
- Feminist Theories of Power
- Marxist Accounts of Power
- Neoliberalism
- Neorealism
- Post-Fordism
- Postmodernist View of Power in International Relations
- Power as Control Theory
- Power To and Power Over
- Queer Theories of Power
- Realism in International Relations
- Realist Accounts of Power
- Relational Power
- Social Power
- Striving for Superiority
- System Justification Theory
- Third Face
- Three Faces of Power
- Animal Groups, Power in
- Consensual Power, Theories of
- Constructivist View of Power in International Relations
- Critical Theory
- Defensive Realism
- Deterrence Theory
- Elite Theories
- Exercise Fallacy
- Exploitation
- False Consciousness
- Female Leadership Among Mammals
- Fungibility of Power Resources
- Hegemonic Power
- Hegemony
- Heterosexism, Role of Power in
- Human Dominance Motivation
- Ideology
- Imperial Power
- Influence
- Invisible Hand
- Knowledge and Power
- Language and Power
- Legislative Power
- Manipulation
- Media, The
- Military in Government
- Mobilization of Bias
- Monopoly Power
- Networks, Power in
- Networks and Communities
- Nonverbal Communication and Power
- Perceptual Symbols of Power
- Persuasion
- Pluralism
- Police State
- Political Thinking as Power
- Power, Cognition, and Behavior
- Power as Control Theory
- Power Motive
- Power To and Power Over
- Power Transition Theory
- Power With
- Prime Ministerial and Presidential
- Propaganda
- Psychological Empowerment
- Regime Theory in International Relations
- Relational Power
- Relative Autonomy of the State
- Religious Power
- Revolutionary Cell Structure
- Rhetoric
- Sea Power
- Second Face
- Sexism, Role of Power in
- Social Capital
- Social Dominance Theory
- Social Power
- Striving for Superiority
- Symbolic Power and Violence
- Systematic Luck
- Systemic Power
- Terrorism
- Testosterone, Power and
- Third Face
- Threats
- Three Faces of Power
- Throffers
- Transactional and Transformational Leadership
- Will to Power
- Bachrach, Peter, and Baratz, Morton
- Castells, Manuel
- Community Power Debate
- Dahl, Robert A.
- Domhoff, G. William
- Dowding, Keith
- Elite Theories
- Flyvbjerg, Bent
- Growth Coalitions
- Hunter, Floyd
- Lukes, Steven
- Mobilization of Bias
- Non Decision Making
- Pluralism
- Post-Fordism
- Power Elite
- Regime Theory in Urban Politics
- Sabatier, Paul
- Systematic Luck
- Systemic Power
- Third Face
- Three Faces of Power
- World Cities
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