Relative Autonomy Of The State

The autonomy (or relative autonomy) of the state thesis is a reaction both to pluralist accounts of power in society and to Marxist accounts of the domination of capital in state theory. Pluralism was itself originally a radical thesis about democracy that argued that true power or influence existed not in the executive (office of the president or prime minister) or the legislature but comes about through various pressures that are exerted on those institutions through various organized and unorganized groups in society. In some versions of pluralism, the institutions of the state are mere ciphers for all of these interests, and in a democracy politicians will carry out those demands that are strongest among all the groups. In other versions of pluralism, the government does have its own preferences, but it operates as a group like any other in society, sometimes getting its way, sometimes not. Whichever group is strongest in some issue area will determine the policy for that area. In Marxist accounts of the state, power resides in the hands of capital, and the economic structure determines the politics of the nation.

The relative autonomy of the state thesis argues that while pluralist and capitalist pressures exist and seem to influence the state, the state does have its own interests, and in fact it is those interests that determine policy. In Theda Skocpol's famous phrase, “bringing the state back in” allows us to see that the state does have strong interests that it promotes for its own sake.

In neo-Marxist accounts, the state is an entity or agent in its own right. In more mainstream accounts of the autonomy of democratic state, autonomy resides in sets of state actors. Eric Nordlinger, for example, suggests there are three forms of state autonomy: (1) strong, where state actors proceed on their own preferences, even though these preferences clearly diverge from those of society; (2) medium, where state actors change the preferences of society to conform to their own; and (3) weak, where state actors' preferences do not diverge from those of society. In the latter case we cannot tell whether pressure group interests determine policy or not, but it is reasonable to assume the state acts on its own preferences.

Nordlinger suggests that we might find democratic states that by and large conform to one or other of these types. More often, however, we will find a state taking on different forms in different issue areas. Thus, at times we can see state actors rejecting the demands of major organized interests in society—for example, they may push through regulatory procedures or specific taxes that industry opposes. In the medium form we can see government officials arguing for specific policies: politicians on the stump, radio, TV, newspapers, or the Internet; senior bureaucrats giving sage advice through similar media; or experts working for government stating why certain regulations are necessary. In some countries, governments also spend vast amounts on advertising and promoting government policy. Governments also, in Patrick Dunleavy's terms, “preference shape.” That is, they change the preferences of people by their policies. For example, in the United Kingdom the Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher sold off state housing, privatized state industries, and changed the preferences of people toward a homeowning shareholding society more interested in interest-rate levels than in welfare policy.

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