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Relational Power

For the advocates of the relational approach to power, relational power is not just one type of power—power as applied in a relationship. Rather, it is a basic characteristic of all power. In a relational understanding of power, power is not the possession of a person, nor does it correspond to a mere production of effects; it is constituted within a social relation. Only by knowing the respective value systems and beliefs specific to the relationship can the analyst make an attribution of power.

Such a view has important consequences for the analysis of power in that it significantly differs from approaches that either regard resources as the locus of power or hold that attributions of power can be reduced to a study of agents' resources. But the conceptual solution also produces, in turn, several internal problems. One difficulty derives from the way the relational approach links power to causality, which results in a tendency to look for power as a master cause in the analysis of behavior and outcomes. To assume that role, the very assessment of power has to factor in all situational qualifications of the respective social relationship under analysis, which can result in exaggerating the role of power. A second and related problem has to do with the possibility of giving an overall picture of power in a society. Initially, the conceptual move to relational power was meant to criticize simple and aggregate “lump” concepts of power, justifiably requiring a domain-and situation-specific analysis of power instead. But when the research program based on relational specificity is pushed to its conclusion, the analysis risks undermining any aggregate view of power within a polity.

The Relational Concept of Power

The relational conceptualization of power takes place in the context of post-Weberian definitions of power. Max Weber had defined power as any chance (and not probability, as often translated) within a social relation to impose one's will also against the resistance of others, no matter what gives rise to this chance. For Robert Dahl, A has power over B to the extent that A can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do. Hence, the main characteristic of a relational approach is that it locates power in a human relationship, thus distinguishing it from the sheer production of effects (power in nature). At the same time, relational is not to be confused with relative. It does not mean that once the resources are taken into account, there is something more in the power relationship.

Such relational concepts of power are opposed to views that see power in terms of its resources or instruments: power exists in and through a relation, it is not the possession of any agent. In a famous example, Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz illustrate this with reference to a situation in which a sentry levels his gun at an unarmed intruder, whom he orders to halt or else he will shoot. If the intruder stops, it seems the threat has worked: the sentry has exercised power. Bachrach and Baratz deny that this is necessarily so. If the intruder was also a soldier, he or she might obey because that is what a soldier does when receiving an order from a sentry. The alleged power resource was ineffectual here, because it was the intruder's value system that made the intruder obey, not the gun. On the other hand, if the intruder does not obey and is killed, we may again not be seeing a power relationship. Strictly speaking, the killing of the intruder is not power, because the intruder apparently valued entering the base more than his or her own life; the killing only shows the ultimate powerlessness of force (violence) in the face of a suicide attack. (In a more strictly Weberian reading, however, it would be fair to say that the sentry exercised power in imposing his or her will—not to allow anyone unauthorized to enter the base—against the resistance of the intruder.) Pushing the example to its extreme, the intruder may have wanted to commit suicide but gets the sentry to do it for him or her. In this case, the intruder, by being shot, exercises power over the sentry. The central point is that no analysis of power can be made without knowing the relative importance of conflicting values in the mind of the power recipient, if not also of the supposed power holder. The capacity to sanction and the resources on which the sanctions are based are a part of power analysis, but in themselves are insufficient for an attribution of power because what counts as a sanction in the specific power relation is itself dependent on the specific values in the minds of the people involved.

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