Power Transition Theory

Power transition theory is a theory about the probability of war between nations, or groups within nations, based on the changing nature of their relative powers. Balance-of-power theories of international conflict suggest that the international system will remain peaceful if no nation is allowed to acquire much greater strength than any other nation. If any nation or bloc of nations significantly increases its powers, then in order to ensure continuing peace another bloc needs also to strengthen in order to provide a countervailing force. Contrariwise, according to the hegemonic stability thesis a large hegemon is conducive to peace. The hegemon does not itself feel threatened by others and can police conflicts between other nations. Those in the hegemonic stability camp believe there are severe dangers in balance-of-power theories, because the near-parity of power might encourage risk takers to go to war or lead one side to believe that its power is greater than a near rival's and attempt to defeat them. Both these viewpoints take a static stance toward the prospects of peace. Power transition theory can encompass both views in a more dynamic perspective, as it suggests that major conflicts are often a result of a transition in power where a dominant nation or group within a nation faces a rising challenger.

Abramo Organski introduced the power transition theory in his book World Politics in 1958. While associated with realism in international relations, power transition theory is not exclusively realist because, as first set out, it is not entirely concerned with power relations. The propensities of nations to engage in armed conflict are related to the satisfaction that they have with the status quo within the international system. Nations are concerned with general patterns of diplomatic, military, and economic relationships between countries. Organski describes a stable international order as one where all countries know what kind of behavior to expect from others and understand how these relationships ought to be [Page 527]governed: that is, they share similar normative concerns. He does see a role for a dominant nation, but power transition theory does not require one, needing simply that the ordered state of affairs is acceptable to all.

The probability of conflict arises when some nations become dissatisfied with the world order. As some nations become stronger, they might wish to challenge the accepted nature of the diplomatic and economic relationships. They might be prepared to engage in saber rattling or actual armed conflict, but more specifically the dominant nations might feel threatened as these relationships alter. The changing expectations can lead to conflict. Thus there are two factors involved in power transition theory: first, that a challenger nation has gained in power, and second, that it is dissatisfied with the world order in some way.

Originally Organski used his theory to explain the major wars between dominant nations in the international system, but later, with Jacek Kugler, applied the thesis more broadly, analyzing data from 1860 to 1975. Organski and Kugler suggested that conflict was likely within 20 years of a power transition. They split their data into six periods, measuring the relative strength of nations by gross national product (GNP). They examined conflict by set of dyads where any two states for which the smaller's GNP was more than 80% of the larger were considered to be relatively equal. Where one grew larger than another during the period, then in their terms it surpassed the other. They found that, in their data set, no wars occurred between major power pairs in which the two nations were equal and neither surpassed the other. Where powers were unequal, around 13% of their dyads went to war; where they were equal with one surpassing the other, 29% went to war. They conclude that there is support for the power transition theory. Reanalysis of their work by others has found support for their conclusions. However, how strongly power transition theory is supported by the quantitative data depends upon the measure of power of nations that is adopted. Most use GNP, but some studies also use the Correlates of War data (http://www.correlatesofwar.org/datasets.htm) on nations' strength. Furthermore, the transitions of power that have occurred in the modern period do not seem to lead to armed conflict as frequently as they once did. This demonstrates at the very least that other factors—such as international organizations, increasingly global trade, and democratization—have affected the propensity of nations to go to war.

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