Power To And Power Over

Definitions

Although different theoretical perspectives propose different criteria for the definition of the two concepts, it is possible to identify some common traits. The various usages of power over all agree in interpreting it as a relation between actors, specifically as a relation of social causation. Much has been written about the connection between the concept of power and that of social cause: for some authors the two concepts share the same extension; according to others, power is instead to be considered the specific kind of social causation resulting from the intentions of the power wielder. Power to is also explicated in terms of causation. However, the difference lies in the fact that while power over means causing behavior on the part of others, power to refers to the ability to cause certain outcomes or states of affairs. Moreover, power to is a dispositional concept: it refers to the capacity actors possess to bring about specific outcomes, not to their action of producing those results. By contrast, the concept of power over is described as both actual and potential: the phenomenon of power is identified both with the fact of agents actually affecting the behavior of another, and with their having the ability to do so at some future time. Lastly, while power to is commonly interpreted as a property of individuals or of groups, power over has been attributed, by different approaches, to individuals, collectivities, institutions, and social structures.

It is worth noticing that, though the origin of the distinction lies in theoretical efforts to clarify the very meaning of the concept of power, the expressions power to and power over have recently enjoyed a new lease on life within critical approaches and feminist theories, serving to indicate two distinct forms of power. In the latter cases the distinction between the two expressions relies on normative criteria: while power over is thought of as necessarily conflictual and is mostly used as a synonym for domination, power to is regarded as a consensual and intrinsically legitimate form of power.

Among the various contributions to the study of power, power over is undoubtedly the predominant interpretation. Conceptual analyses that are normally indicated by the expression power over define it as a relationship in which one actor is able to obtain compliant behavior from another actor. They make reference to conceptions of power that, following the Weberian tradition, regard it as equivalent to social control and influence.

[Page 522]Dahl and Lukes

In the contemporary literature about power, probably the most influential definition is the one offered by Robert Dahl (1975): “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.” In Dahl's account, power is assimilated to an actual or potential relation of social causation: it consists in a relation in which an actor intentionally and successfully acts—or is able to act—to modify the behavior of another actor. The same interpretation of power in terms of power over is assumed by all the participants in the debate that Steven Lukes labeled the three-dimensional view of power. In Power: A Radical View, Lukes analyzes Dahl's conception of power, together with that of two of his most important critics, Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz. He labels them respectively the one- and the two-dimensional views of power, and he himself proposes the so-called three-dimensional view. Despite the differences among the three approaches, Lukes claims that they share a common core: they all consist in different applications of the same underlying concept of power, according to which “A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B's interests” (2005, p. 30). They diverge, instead, over the relevant interpretation of interests: while Dahl focuses his analysis on subjective interests understood in terms of preferences expressed through political participation, the second view also includes those subjective interests that are excluded from the political debate. Lukes goes even farther, focusing, in addition, on the real (or objective) interests of which individuals are not aware. Lukes's analysis, then, explicitly highlights the conflictual nature of power. Moreover, it assumes power to be an intrinsically evaluative concept: if exercising power means acting against the interests of someone, the concept of power virtually collapses into the concept of harming. Power over, then, in Lukes's account, becomes a synonym for domination. It is worth noticing that in the second edition of Power: A Radical View, Lukes partially changes his mind. He recognizes that power over should be interpreted as a broader concept than that of domination: some exercises of power can play in favor of the interests of the subjects, or at least not damage them, as in the cases, for example, of parenting or teaching. Concerning the nature of the power wielder, Lukes's analysis consists in an attempt to bridge the gap between methodologically individualist and structuralist approaches to power. He suggests that power is not necessarily wielded intentionally, but that it can be exercised by actors who are unaware of the consequences of their actions, or even through inaction. According to Lukes, then, locating power should consist, in these cases, of fixing responsibilities, that is, in the identification of those who could have acted otherwise.

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