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Offense/Defense Dominance

Scholars of international relations use the term offense/defense balance to refer to the relative ease of conquering versus defending territory. The offense is strong if conquering and holding territory is relatively easy. The defense is strong if conquest is relatively hard. Conquest is almost never actually easier than defense. Rather, even when offense is strong it usually remains somewhat harder than defense. Accordingly, scholars use the term offense dominance to refer to situations where conquest is unusually easy (even if defense remains easier than offense in absolute terms), and defense dominance to refer to situations where conquest is unusually difficult. Thus, military conditions in Western Europe were offense dominant in 1939–1940, as shown by Germany's quick conquests of Poland, France, and the Low Countries, although defense probably remained somewhat easier than offense in those years.

Scholars distinguish the strategic offense/defense balance from the tactical offense/defense balance. The strategic offense/defense balance refers to the relative ease of conquering states versus defending states from conquest. The tactical offense/defense balance is a more local concept, defining the relative ease of offense and defense between military forces, especially at a point of attack.

A tactical defensive or offensive advantage tends to create a strategic defensive or offensive advantage, but exceptions can be found. For example, sometimes a successful attack on an opposing army cannot be translated into decisive strategic victory over the opposing state. Thus, Napoleon's armies defeated Russia's armies in battle in 1812 but could not conquer Russia. Napoleon could not translate tactical offensive success into strategic success, and so won battles but lost the war.

Factors Shaping the Offense/Defense Balance

The offense/defense balance is shaped by military, geographic, and domestic social and political factors, as well as by international institutions such as alliances.

Military technology, doctrine, and force posture can favor the offense or the defense. For example, the coming of nuclear weapons strongly favored the defense. Any state with a secure nuclear deterrent is secure from conquest, as it can annihilate any attacker. And a secure deterrent is far easier to maintain than to threaten, so nuclear powers can defend themselves against states with many times their economic power—as they often could not before nuclear weapons appeared. Hence the nuclear revolution is a defensive revolution in warfare.

Guerrilla war is a defensive form of war, because it is useful for defending territory but not for aggression. Hence the development of guerrilla doctrine and the spread of small arms (which enable guerrilla tactics) in the 20th century moved the global offense/defense balance toward the defense.

The development of the machine gun, rapid fire rifles, barbed wire, and railroads (which enhanced the mobility of defenders but not attackers) favored the defense in Western Europe in 1914–1918. On the other hand, the development of tanks, combined with Germany's invention of a new offensive armored doctrine—blitzkrieg—moved the offense/defense balance in Europe back toward the offense in the late 1930s.

Geographic barriers such as mountains, rivers, or oceans favor the defense by impeding the movement of attackers. Conquest among island states is hard because water barriers protect them from one another. Conquest among states that lie exposed on an open plain is easier. Densely forested terrain favors the defense by supporting guerrilla resistance against invaders.

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