Michels, Robert (1876–1936)

Robert Michels is the paradigm theorist of oligarchy. His main text is Political Parties; first published in 1911, it represents a landmark in the study of organizational dynamics. Originally a sympathizer with revolutionary Marxism, Michels came to despair of democracy's viability and (reluctantly) accepted elite theory. One of his core ideas is that usually one group of elites does not simply replace another. Rather, there is an ongoing process of power-sharing pacts, with the older sections absorbing and assimilating the new elements: not so much a circulation des elites as a réunion des elites. Recognizing this, and realizing the potential of charismatic leaders to break through rank-and-file apathy, he went on to become an adherent of Mussolini's fascism. His key claim is that power in organizations will inexorably concentrate in the higher echelons of their bureaucratic hierarchies. Organizations are subject to and will succumb to the unyielding and deterministic tendencies that constitute what he terms “the iron law of oligarchy.” The iron law, as the name suggests, has universal application. The argument is that due to obstacles inherent in their internal edifices, mass parties, trade unions, and large-scale pressure groups will inevitably degenerate into self-perpetuating oligarchies. As these organizations are indispensable to the state, society, Michels reasons, cannot be democratic. To test his hypothesis, he studied organizations within the socialist movement, especially the German Social Democratic Party (SPD). At the time, the latter was the world's largest socialist party and the most committed to maintaining democracy in its internal organization. Supposedly, it would be here that a counterexample might exist. However, Michels found that the SPD was, as he predicted, incapable of sustaining nonoligarchic structures of accountability between the leadership and the rank and file. The socialist society of free individuals, he came to argue, is absurdly naive. His work remains central to the study of organizational structures, and is still of great interest to the student of elite theory, socialism, and democracy.

The complex of tendencies that prevent the fulfillment of democracy may be classified into those dependent upon organizational necessities and those that are irreducible psychological imperatives. First, organizations are characterized by an extensive differentiation of function, and the expert leadership required to fulfill technical imperatives of efficiency ensures that the power of determination quickly concentrates disproportionately in their hands. As a corollary, leaders become independent of the control of the collective will. This, the technical indispensability of leadership, is the principal cause of oligarchy. Second, leaders become accustomed to oligarchic privilege and develop an urge to dominate others, while the masses have a need to be guided and require leaders they can venerate; feelings of gratitude help guarantee the leaders' continual reelection. These are the two main premises upon which Michels develops his thesis that democracy contains an oligarchic nucleus. He provides three different yet interrelated theories about the origins and development of oligarchy, even though the relationship between them is not always clear. He has what Herbert Kilschelt calls two weak and one strong conception of oligarchy. They are a theory of transaction costs, a theory of membership lethargy (weak, or preliminary, theories), and a theory of elite control (strong theory). The weak theories build on the elite theories of Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca, while the strong notion goes beyond them. The weak notion is critical of direct democracy, in particular of the idea that all members of an organization are able to participate equally in the collective decision-making process. Due to the actual numbers involved, this is mechanically and technically impossible. The strong notion stresses that the interests of elites and those of the masses will polarize. Initially, a leadership clique may be responsive to its constituency, but as the organization matures, professional leaders become stable and evolve into a remote institution. From here they form a kind of cartel and build up a metaphysical wall. Democratic control, Michels concludes, is reduced to a minimum. Expressed laconically, the underlying sociological law of all modern democratic parties is, “Who says organization, says oligarchy.”

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