Freedom

It is widely agreed that freedom consists in a relation among three things: an agent, constraints, and purposes. Thus, all claims about freedom refer at least implicitly to an agent who is free from certain constraints to realize a certain purpose or set of purposes. Unfortunately, there is also a great deal of disagreement about what counts as an agent, about what kinds of obstacles can count as constraints on freedom, and about which purposes an agent can be considered free or unfree to realize. Freedom, no less than power, is a contested concept. As a result, the relation between freedom and power is both complex and controversial.

Liberal political philosophers tend to characterize the relevant constraints narrowly—as acts of physical prevention or coercion by other agents—and the relevant purposes broadly—as anything the agent might conceivably desire to do or become. Thus, if A locks B in a room, B is unfree to leave (A is physically preventing something that B might conceivably desire to do). Similarly, if A leaves the door open but threatens to punish B heavily should B leave, B is unfree to leave. By contrast, if the reason B stays in the room is that B has an irrational fear of leaving, or is suffering from a debilitating disease, most liberal theorists will say that, although B is unable to leave (i.e., lacks the “power to” leave), B is nevertheless free to leave. This conception of freedom is often called the “negative” conception because of its emphasis on the absence of interference by others.

Many radical political theorists have contested the liberal conception of freedom, holding, among other things, that a wider set of obstacles can constitute constraints on freedom. Depending on the particular conception of freedom adopted, this wider set of constraints might include obstacles of natural origin (such as genetic disabilities or environmental conditions) and “internal” obstacles (such as ignorance, fear, or a mistaken view of one's own interests). Such alternative conceptions of freedom are generally known as “positive” because they identify freedom with ability (i.e., the “power to” achieve given ends) or, more strongly still, with the following of self-imposed rules or the realization of authentic purposes (freedom as personal autonomy or self-mastery or self-realization).

Is B made unfree when A exercises power over B? It might be thought that, at least on the negative conception (where unfreedom, like “power over,” [Page 265]is necessarily a social relation), A's power entails B's unfreedom, and vice versa. In reality, however, the relation is less straightforward. First, power over is a relation between wills: A exercises power over B by modifying B's will, as a result of which B decides to do something that B would not otherwise have done, whereas negative unfreedom is not necessarily a relation between wills. Physical prevention is not a relation between wills: when A locks B in a room, A causes B's body to stay in the room without modifying B's will as concerns staying or leaving. We must recognize, then, that there can be negative unfreedom (of B) without power (of A). Second, most theorists recognize that there are forms of power over other than coercion (e.g., conditioning, manipulation, offers). When A exercises these alternative forms of power, A affects B's behavior without restricting B's negative freedom. We must also recognize, then, that there can be power (of A) without negative unfreedom (of B).

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