Skip to main content icon/video/no-internet

Distributive Justice

Justice is often taken to hold over two domains: the distributive and the corrective. The latter is concerned with questions of punishment and rectifications of injustices. The former concerns the just distribution of the benefits and (nonpunitive) burdens of social life. These include civil and political rights as well as income, wealth, health care, and so on. Debates about distributive justice are critical to contemporary politics. In this entry, we consider arguments that justice requires promoting welfare; an equal distribution of holdings; a distribution that benefits the worst off; and a distribution that merely respects the rights of property holders. Finally, we ask whether justice should have the central place accorded it in contemporary political thinking.

Justice is a matter of each person receiving what is due to him or her. In the liberal tradition, this ties it closely to the formal idea of equality that requires that things that are relevantly alike should be treated alike. In the absence of relevant differences between people, justice requires that each be treated as an equal. Of course, without an account of “relevant differences” and of what it is to be “treated as an equal,” this does not tell us very much. Indeed, one way to characterize many of the debates in distributive justice is as being about the characteristics or properties that might count in distinguishing persons and over the meaning of the demand to treat persons as equals.

These debates have tended to focus on the distribution of income, wealth, and the goods of economic activity generally (and that will be the focus here). In the matter of civil and political rights, there is a broad consensus that has held since the end of World War II that there are no relevant differences between sane, adult, citizens and that each is entitled to an equal share of such rights in recognition of his or her status as a citizen (although even here there are debates about the scope of justice—whether it applies only to citizens, or to everyone, or to everyone in a territory including migrants and children, etc.; this entry will not consider these questions).

Utilitarian Theories of Justice

Perhaps the most obvious way to justify some or other distribution of goods—or to justify principles that ought to govern the institutions that together determine that distribution—is by reference to whether what results advances the overall or average welfare of those affected by it. This is the case made by utilitarians who hold that the right principles of distributive justice are those that will bring about greatest future utility (i.e., the greatest future good for persons, however that is defined). This means that the right content of the principles of justice is an empirical matter. Although most utilitarians agree that having equal civil and political rights will maximize utility, there is no similar agreement on the economic arrangements (socialist, capitalist, mixed, etc.) that will achieve that goal.

Although utilitarian theories are attractively simple and appeal to an intuitively plausible criterion for thinking about just institutions (surely one consideration in thinking about the institutions we have ought to be their consequences for human welfare?), they are widely criticized for failing to respect the rights of persons. Consider, for example, a distribution in which some have an abundance of goods and others are kept in abject misery and yet which is utility maximizing (the utility gained by the rich being greater than the disutility suffered by the poor). According to utilitarianism, this is acceptable, and it is just.

...

  • Loading...
locked icon

Sign in to access this content

Get a 30 day FREE TRIAL

  • Watch videos from a variety of sources bringing classroom topics to life
  • Read modern, diverse business cases
  • Explore hundreds of books and reference titles

Sage Recommends

We found other relevant content for you on other Sage platforms.

Loading