Conventional Deterrence

Deterrence is a strategy by which one actor, such as a government or state, attempts to prevent another actor from taking a particular course of action. Deterrence has been most closely associated with so-called weapons of mass destruction: one state has threatened another state to deter that state from taking a particular course of action by threatening to inflict great damage as a consequence. This was most clearly demonstrated in the cold war with the adoption of mutually assured destruction (MAD) where both sides developed a sufficiently large nuclear arsenal to prevent them from going into direct conflict with one another. However, deterrence is a far older concept and is not solely the preserve of weapons of mass destruction or, indeed, the preserve of states and their governments. States can develop deterrent relationships with nonstate actors, and such actors can also develop deterrent relationships with one another, thus resulting in the emergence of a code of conduct and a ceiling on the level of violence between them.

Conventional deterrence covers the various forms of deterrence using conventional weapons. Here, conventional weapons are deemed to be those that exclude weapons of mass destruction—that is, not nuclear, chemical, biological, or radiological weapons. Like forms of deterrence involving weapons of mass destruction, conventional deterrence can be subdivided into two forms: deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial. Deterrence by punishment threatens an opponent that if that opponent embarks on a particular course of action, the opponent will suffer from some form of attack that will lead to damage being inflicted on the opponent or its interests. Thus, the targeting focuses on the opponent and what level of pain needs to be threatened to prevent the opponent from taking a particular course of action. Deterrence by denial involves threatening the gain from a particular course of action: in other words, preventing the opponent from taking control of the very thing they want.

Success is measured by an opponent's deciding not to embark on the opponent's intended course of action—that is, nothing happening, rather than by some form of gain. For example, a state may [Page 143]create its own air defense capability that threatens any incursion of its air space by another. Success would be evidenced by a lack of incursions, not by the number of aircraft shot down while infringing the air space.

For deterrence to successfully work, a number of factors need to be in play. First, there need to be two parties who acknowledge that they are in a deterrent relationship—a deterrer and a deterree. Failure to appreciate that there is a deterrent relationship will ensure that deterrence will fail. Thus, when asked why Britain failed to deter the Argentinean military from invading the Falklands in 1982, Britain's Defense Secretary John Nott stated that he was unaware such a relationship existed. There needs to be a clear objective—the deterrer wants to stop the deterree from taking a particular course of action. There then needs to be some form of mechanism to persuade a deterree from taking the proposed course of action, such as a threat or series of threats.

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