Consensual Power, Theories Of

The Concept

The literature on power is essentially scalar regarding consensus and conflict. At one end of the scale, theorists such as Max Weber, Michael Mann, Robert Dahl, and Steven Lukes view power purely in terms of conflict. At the other end, Hannah Arendt, Talcott Parsons, and Barry Barnes represent the consensual end of the spectrum. Theorists such as Anthony Giddens, Stewart Clegg, Keith Dowding, Mark Haugaard, Peter Morriss, and Michel Foucault encompass both consensual and conflictual aspects of power.

In thinking about consensual power, two aspects have to be clearly distinguished. First, consensus can be defined in terms of outcomes or goals pursued, which gives a fairly narrow conceptualization of consensual power. In this case, any exercise of consensual power is directed toward an objective that is shared by all involved. Thus conceived, consensual power is a form of empowerment that entails only power to. The typical manifestation of this would be a group of like-minded people coming together to create an organization for a common purpose.

Second, consensual power can be seen in terms of power over. Many exercises of power over others and acts of domination rest on some deep form of consensus. This can take two forms: on the one hand, conflict can be structured within a shared framework of consensus, in which case, consensus with regard to the rules of the game are a form of constraint whereby power over is managed. In this case, the consensus is not in itself part of a system of relations of domination. On the other hand, the other form of consensual power is where the consent is intrinsic to domination and thus considered somehow normatively problematic. In the Marxist tradition, hegemony, and in Foucault's work, epistemes or discourse, are considered forms of domination that are built on the consent by less powerful or subaltern actors.

To make sense of these more complex, compound forms of power, where a consensus and conflict are combined, we should distinguish between empirical sociological observations and normative claims appropriate to political theory. When there is de facto consent; in the Marxist, Foucauldian, and feminist positions, it is thought that there is potential, but as yet unmanifested, conflict. However, this hypothesis can only be justified based on a normative evaluation to the effect that weaker consenting social actors should not consent. When we assert that a given class suffers from “false consciousness” (three-dimensional power) or is subservient to a “hegemonic” discourse, the less powerful actor B consents to the power relations in question and the observing social scientist or theorists thinks (possibly for good reasons) that the actor should not be consenting, thus designating the situation as one of conflict, [Page 134]despite the empirical fact of consent. Here we have sociological consent, which is labeled conflictual for normative reasons. To justify such an evaluation, the observer/theorist must develop clear normative criteria for making such a judgment call.

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