Chicken Games

Figure 1 Game matrix for chicken: (a) specific; (b) generic.

Various signals, tactics, and strategic moves can enhance the bargaining power of a player and his or her probability of victory. If one player can make an absolutely credible commitment to stand firm, the other is compelled to give in. Likewise, if one player can convey the impression that he or she is crazy, reckless, stumble-down drunk, and so on (perhaps by actually being so), the other may likewise be compelled to give in. Conversely, if one player publicly attributes rationality, caution, or cowardice to the other, or if the former claims that he or she believes that his or her car is crash-proof (or that martyrdom is a ticket to heaven), that player thereby conveys to the other player that the first player believes he or she can safely stand firm. More perversely, if a player takes some visible action that actually increases the player's cost of giving in, he or she thereby makes it more likely that the other player must give in. For example, hostage holders can kill one or a few hostages, so that they must expect a worse penalty if they give in and are captured. Real-world conflicts play out through a chronological sequence of moves not represented in the 2 × 2 chicken matrix. In such a sequence, each player can try to displace onto the other the “last clear chance” to avoid mutual disaster, forcing the other player either to give in or “start the shooting,” anticipating that the other player will be unwilling to do the latter and will therefore give in. Finally, a player can explicitly stake his or her future reputation on standing firm in the present conflict. Thus, although the repeated play of a prisoner's dilemma can induce mutual cooperation, the expectation of repeated play of the game of chicken increases the incentive for each player to stand firm to gain a reputation that will intimidate later opponents.

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