Authority

The concept of authority is closely related to that of power. However, many writers suggest that it is possible for an agent to have power without authority or, conversely, authority without power. Thus, power and authority are two entirely different concepts.

Authority, unlike power, is usually thought to have greater normative force. That is, if someone is in authority, this gives that person some legal or normative right to issue commands and be obeyed. Those under the authority of another have a duty to obey the authoritative commands of the person in authority. Of course, those with legal authority might overstep their rights in issuing commands or issue commands that are immoral. Furthermore, if a legal system is itself immoral, then we might not consider the legal authorities to be legitimate in issuing commands. However, neither of these points detracts from the point that the idea of authority itself gives normative force, and the concept is one imbued with rights and duties. The central question concerning the concept of authority is why people should subordinate themselves to it. The question itself presupposes some liberal notion that people are free and relinquishing that freedom requires justification, but this does not make the central question any less important.

A distinction often made in the literature is between a person in a position of authority and a person who is an authority. Someone who is an authority is a person considered knowledgeable or expert in some area. We consult people who are authorities in this sense to gain advice and information. Thus, one academic might consult another on a subject about which the latter is deemed particularly knowledgeable. We turn to doctors for advice regarding medical conditions or to lawyers for legal advice. These people can be considered authorities in their particular areas. And they too can recognize other actors as more authoritative than they: so doctors and lawyers refer patients and clients to specialist practitioners. We take the advice of those who are authorities in this sense because we believe they know better than we do in the areas in which we consult them. However, we are not obliged legally or morally to follow it through, though in most cases we choose to do so because we believe it in our best interests to do so. We might recognize that advice to be sage—good doctors and lawyers will explain why we should follow their advice—but even when we do not understand the reasoning behind it, we might choose to follow the advice of an expert. When we act in this way, we are said to act for “content-independent” reasons. That is, although we feel justified in carrying out those actions because we trust the expert has good reasons for directing us thus, we do not understand what those good reasons are. Our own reason with [Page 37]regard to the justification of the action itself is “contentless”: “because the expert said so.” We shall see that the concept of content-independent reasons is important for understanding the moral force of authority.

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