Argument, Power of

Argument is the provision of reasons to justify a conclusion. One alternative is bargaining where the interested parties “cut a deal” so that they all satisfy at least some of their interests. Another alternative is assertion, where willfulness is sufficient justification for proposed action. Assertion goes straight to the conclusion, bypassing the process of justification. Why is justification important? The answer takes us to the power of argument: justification disconnects judgments of the legitimacy of the proposal from the quantum of power of the proposer (“do it or else”) and reconnects them to the qualitative merits of the proposal (“I accept your reasons”). This entry deals mainly with the public power of argument in managing social and political conflict, but says little about the pure power of logic or the framework of fallacies of bad argument treated in philosophical analysis.

Argument involves claims about evidence and usually stops short of conclusive demonstration. Argument is usually part of a process of debate with different sides contending for different propositions. The frequency of references to “a good argument” conveys this debating dimension to argument, with different sides contending “for” or [Page 29]“against” the main propositions or even the very agenda of business. As a result, many “good arguments” are inconclusive; at the end of the day, there is no agreement among contending parties about the right conclusion or sometimes even the right debating process.

So why bother with argument if the prospect of agreement is low? Belief in the value of argument rests on two sets of views of the power of argument. The first set relates to the power of argument “in theory” and the second set relates to this power “in practice.” The former deals with the capacity of argument to contribute to philosophical debate, whereas the latter deals with the contribution of argument to practical debate over political and social affairs. These two sets of theory and practice are related in the same ways that theoretical and practical reasoning are related. Theoretical reasoning can be seen as the primary form of argument and practical reasoning the secondary form. Thus, the power of argument in theoretical discourse provides one venerable standard for assessing the available powers of argument found in practical discussion. The more open public decision making can be made to the norms of argument, the more likely it is that conflict will be resolved impartially through due processes of decision making—that is, with decisions based on the merits of the argument as distinct from decisions reflecting the interests of those engaged in argument.

Democracy is historically associated with the belief in the power of argument. Classical Athens had its moment of high democracy, and Thucydides' History provides portraits of decent public argument marshaled by rare leaders such as Pericles (e.g., Thucydides II, 34–46) and case studies of moving public debate involving contending arguments by such rhetorically gifted speakers as Cleon and Diodotus (e.g., Thucydides III, 36–50). The best case for this inspiring world of democratic argument is probably that left by Aristotle, whose Politics pays due respect to public reason but whose Rhetoric lays out the real power of argument in the public sphere. And here we see the limited nature of practical argument when compared with the philosophy standard. Political argument is an exercise in rhetorical as well as philosophical power, adapting theory to the demands of rhetoric to get the required assent. Think of this as a theory of the second best: the power of argument in public affairs is less than the ideal available in pure theory, but the ideal is not practically feasible. The lesson from Aristotle is that the operational power of practical argument comes down to the blend of three elements: the ethos or perceived character of the argument maker, the pathos or mood of the audience, and finally (and perhaps least powerfully), the merits of the logos or core reasoning of the argument.

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