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A modus vivendi is literally a “way of living,” a working arrangement between contending parties that enables peaceful coexistence while the parties attempt to work out the dispute. In contemporary political theory, it has become associated with a way of thinking about the stability of a society characterized by deep pluralism—whether ideological, religious, national, cultural, or ethnic. The term has also become associated, in particular, with the work of the American philosopher John Rawls and his account of the conditions required for a society to be not only just but stable. This entry reviews Rawls's analysis and its limitations.

For Rawls, a “well-ordered” society is one in which citizens affirm the same general conception of justice, not because of enforced religious, cultural, or philosophical ideology, but on the basis of publicly justifiable principles and the considered judgments of its citizens. A well-ordered society not only advances the good of its members but is also effectively regulated by a shared conception of justice. This “political” conception of justice, Rawls claims, is one that could gain the assent of citizens, despite deep pluralism. A society organized around such a conception is stable, Rawls argues, not in an empirical sense but in the normative sense: It rests upon a publicly justifiable conception of justice, wherein society is conceived as a fair system of cooperation, and citizens as free and equal.

Rawls contrasts this conception of a well-ordered, stable society with that of a “mere” modus vivendi. A modus vivendi, for Rawls, is akin to a treaty between states. The terms and conditions of a treaty represent an equilibrium point between the two parties, but each remains ready to impose its will on the other if the advantages of breaking the agreement begin to outweigh the costs. Stability is thus conditional and fragile. By analogy, a society founded on a modus vivendi is neither well-ordered nor stable, and social unity only ever apparent.

However, there have been attempts to rescue the notion of a modus vivendi from this Rawlsian analysis. The more seriously one takes pluralism, the greater the pressure on the Rawlsian conception of a well-ordered society. A more realistic account of stability might require embracing something like a modus vivendi. And there might be a form of modus vivendi that is less than a Rawlsian overlapping consensus, but more than a mere peace treaty. Rawls seems to assume that a modus vivendi entails that the parties remain committed to overturning the arrangements whenever possible. But a modus vivendi might well acquire resilience and commitment over time, just because of the persistence of plurality and the increasing awareness of the parties that this is indeed the best way to proceed, given the circumstances they face.

DuncanIvison

Further Readings

Ivison, D. (2002). Postcolonial liberalism. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Neal, P. (1997). Liberalism and its discontents. Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan.
Rawls, J. (1993). Political liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.
Williams, B. (2005). In the beginning was the deed: Realism and moralism in political argument. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
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