Pluralistic Ignorance

The term pluralistic ignorance was first used as a psychological term by the social psychologist Floyd Allport in the 1920s to describe mistaken impressions [Page 552]or misjudgments about others' beliefs, emotions, or thoughts. The term gained wide currency in the 1970s to describe patterns of false beliefs as applicable to the political arena or other social issues.

Pluralistic ignorance functions on the psychological level insofar as it explains the aspect of ignorance and on the social level to help understand the pluralistic element of the phenomena. Pluralistic ignorance occurs when people mischaracterize the number of people who hold similar or same opinions. For example, a person may believe that a majority of people subscribes to a position actually held by a minority. Conversely, one may believe that a majority position represents the views of a minority. In 1972, Charles Korte identified a distinction between “absolute pluralistic ignorance,” the belief that a majority represents a minority or vice versa, and “relative pluralistic ignorance,” overestimating or underestimating the degree to which others share one's beliefs or sentiments.

A central tenant of pluralistic ignorance is that people often develop or adjust their beliefs in concert with their perception of public opinion or social norms. The degree of inaccurate social projections regarding the distribution of public opinion is manifested on various matters on a continuum. Studies have shown mistakenly perceived social norms or other impressions of public opinion with respect to political candidates, voting preferences, civil rights, racial segregation, or prohibitions against smoking or drinking. For example, pluralistic ignorance can be used to explain how many southern whites overestimated national support for Jim Crow Laws in the 1960s.

Psychological factors such as fear of embarrassment and inhibitions affect the gulf between what one believes in private and expresses in public. However, recent scholars have tended to stress the social norms, cultural values, and shared aspects as opposed to the individual, psychological, and cognitive motivations of pluralistic ignorance. A majority opinion on a particular issue is expected to represent basic values that culturally resonate and match societal norms. External factors such as social environment, political climate, prominence of public agenda, diversity of communication channels, and media framing also mediate the development and degree of pluralistic ignorance.

The media are particularly considered to play a central role in development and maintenance of pluralistic ignorance. Noelle-Newman has emphasized how journalists' political leanings often create a social environment that does not necessarily reflect the distribution of opinion among the general audience. Media tend to overemphasize the views of minority groups that are particularly vocal or visible, even within the context of reinforcing existing social norms. Thus, pluralistic ignorance emerges often when public perceptions do not synchronize with public opinion. Elihu Katz indicated, on the other hand, that the media may dispel pluralistic ignorance by presenting an accurate portrayal of public opinion. For instance, the media may enlighten the audience by reporting on a scientifically valid survey of public attitudes or presenting a balanced presentation of a controversial issue.