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Philosophers think of perception as a sensory experience (also called a sensation) that provides the perceiver with knowledge concerning the external world. This leads into an approach to perception that diverges importantly from those taken in science and in everyday thinking.

Three clarifications:

  • A sensory experience is one that has a characteristically visual, auditory, or other-sensory character. Such an experience need not originate from the sense organs.
  • “External” means external to the conscious mind. Accordingly, the perceiver's own body should be considered a part of the “external” world.
  • In philosophy, “knowledge” means something quite specific. In order for me to know something in the philosophical sense—for instance, for me to know that my friend is walking up the path to my front door—it should not only be true that she is doing this, but, more than this, I should be in a position to guarantee that she is. (A guarantee need not be absolute; many consider it enough if one can show that something is overwhelmingly likely.)

Unpacking the previous conception, then, perception is a sensory experience that allows me to guarantee some condition of the external world. Suppose I look out of the window and seem to see my friend walking up the path. Does this give me what I need to guarantee that she is? Only if it does, does my experience count as visually perceiving her. (This will be qualified and clarified in the following section.)

Notice that many sensations do not even begin to count as perception by this criterion. Somebody hits you on the head, and you “see stars.” You are in a very quiet room and “hear” internally generated white noise. You have been sitting in an airplane seat too long and feel “pins and needles” in your feet. In these cases, you have experiences with visual, auditory, or tactual character. But these experiences do not allow you to guarantee anything about the external world. They do not amount, therefore, to perception. In this entry, the philosophical approaches to perception are covered, including direct perception (including skepticism), sense data, simple and complex qualities, representationalism, and the theories of representational content.

Direct Perception

Now let's take a look at how philosophers put the concept of direct perception to work. You see a familiar-looking object—a chair perhaps—and are asked how far away it is. Without hesitation, you respond: “10 feet” or “3 paces.” Given normal vision, humans can make such estimates quickly and accurately. Animals, too, are good at this kind of task: Of course, they cannot verbally answer the question, but they seem to sense how far away things are and adjust their behavior accordingly. For example, a dog might just stretch its paw for a nearby morsel of food, but if the food is far away, it would get up and walk to it. This shows that it can estimate distance. From these familiar facts, a scientist might conclude:

I. We perceive distance by vision.

And this is indeed what we would say in everyday contexts.

But wait! Suppose that you are viewing the chair through a peephole in a psychology lab. It looks 10 feet away, but the experimenter might be playing a trick on your eyes. The chair might be much larger than the ones you normally encounter, and because of the odd perspective forced on you by the peephole, you may have failed to appreciate its true size. Though it looks 10 feet away, it may actually be 15 feet away. Can you be sure that this is not what is going on? Maybe you should be less confident. Maybe you can't guarantee that it is 10 feet away.

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